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Abstract 
This thesis research explores integrating a reputation-based trust mechanism with an 
agent-based backup protection system to improve the performance of traditional backup 
relay methods that are currently in use in power transmission systems.  Integrating agent 
technology into relay protection schemes has been previously proposed to clear faults 
more rapidly and to add precision by enabling the use of adaptive protection methods.  A 
distributed, cooperative trust system such as that used in peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks has the potential to add an additional layer of defense in a protection system 
designed to operate with greater autonomy.  This trust component enables agents in the 
system to make assessments using additional, behavioral-based analysis of cooperating 
protection agents.  Simulation results illustrate the improved decision-making capability 
achieved by incorporating this cooperative trust method when experiencing abnormal or 
malicious communications.  The integration of this additional trust component provides 
an added push for implementing the proposed agent-based protection schemes to help 
mitigate the impact from wide-area disturbances and the cascading blackouts that often 
follow.  As the push for electric grid modernization continues, an agent-based trust 
system including this type of behavioral-based analysis will also benefit other smart 
components connecting critical grid control and monitoring information systems. 
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REPUTATION-BASED TRUST FOR A COOPERATIVE, AGENT-BASED 
BACKUP PROTECTION SCHEME FOR POWER NETWORKS 
 
I.  Introduction 
ESEARCH into the improvement of protective relays used for the protection of 
electrical power transmission and distribution systems has further increased 
following findings released after the investigations into the August 2003 blackout 
affecting the Northeastern United States and Canada.  The instability resulting from 
cascading outages was identified as a primary cause of the uncontrolled blackout 
spreading across a wide geographic area [59].  This research has been ongoing since the 
mid-1980’s when the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
sponsored a study indicating that protective relays were involved in 75 percent of major 
power system interruptions [48].  The importance of proper protection settings is 
amplified during times of system disturbance.   
1.1  Background 
Many problems involving relay failures are not exposed until external fault 
conditions occur or the system is operating at or near its limits.  As part of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, grid modernization was directed to ensure that 
electricity could be reliably and securely provided to meet future growth requirements 
[1].  While grid interconnections have become a standard method of ensuring redundant 
paths between power sources and load destinations in a grid, these modernization efforts 
are looking at better integration of communications networks to provide increased control 
R 
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opportunities.  As a result, the electric grid is becoming more unified which may intensify 
cascading problems that result when a relay causes a trip at an undesired time. 
Improved network capabilities have enabled grid modernization efforts.  Utility 
companies are able to gather more information, quicker than ever before.  Utilizing more 
readily available commercial off the shelf (COTS) products has changed the industry 
from revolving around proprietary technology to integrating more open communications 
standards [55].  Increased information has helped improve the situational awareness of 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system operators and enabled industry 
to base business decisions around real-time data.  However, this integration has also 
opened the system to remotely executed computer-based network attacks. 
Power and other utility networks are increasingly the subject of attack [19], [20], 
[22], and [56].  Threats to the power grid and other elements of critical infrastructure are 
likely to occur at times of war preparation such as during the mobilization and 
deployment phases [44] to cause delays and backlogs at key logistics locations [16] and 
[31].  Other research [63] focused specifically on attack strategies designed to amplify the 
cascading effects of grid failures.  Improving the reliability and security of the grid 
protection elements and the underlying communications networks will have a direct 
impact on the ability of the US armed forces to continue to deploy and rapidly project 
force where needed anywhere around the globe. 
1.2  Overview and Goals 
Transmission line protection systems are particularly vulnerable to these types of 
cyber attacks.  The physical and network protection in place is insufficient given their 
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capability to control switch gear and the flow of electricity [55].  As modernization 
increases there has been a larger focus on improving the security of control networks.  
This thesis introduces a reputation-based trust mechanism to help supplement more 
traditional network protection mechanisms and will augment the layered security 
approaches as recommended in [14].  The research goal will also enable system operators 
to gather more insight into the behavior of essential control components using both 
operational and nonoperational data. 
Public standards such as IEC 61850 and the transition to internet technology have 
increased interoperability but also made the power networks more vulnerable to attack.  
A peer-to-peer (P2P) based trust scheme will enhance the effectiveness of the other 
network protection mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls.  This 
thesis shows that cooperative information sharing produces improved decision-making 
capability through coordinated fault verification to reduce grid area isolation and enables 
more responsive breaker reactions to system faults when compared to traditional fault 
clearing mechanisms.  As this type of trust system is refined, it can be of extreme 
importance, adding reliability and security to a utility network, especially if integrated 
into a segregated Utility Intranet [14].   
1.3  Organization 
The following chapters discuss agent-based technology and its applications in 
transmission network protection as well as cooperative trust arrangements in peer-to-peer 
systems.  Chapter II covers established research in the areas of the power grid, traditional 
and proposed protection mechanisms, cooperative trust systems, and potential threats to 
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grid security.  Chapter III details the methodology used for assessing the ability of an 
agent-based cooperative trust protection mechanism.  This mechanism must recognize 
behavior that might cause incorrect or unreliable decision making and react appropriately, 
producing correct results more rapidly than traditional backup protection mechanisms.  
Chapter IV gives an analysis of why important features were included in the trust scheme 
and provides the experimental results from simulated scenarios.  Finally, Chapter V 
summarizes this thesis work and its contributions and suggests future research 
opportunities in this area. 
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II.  Literature Review 
he power grid is just one element of a nation’s critical infrastructure, however 
many of the other elements essential to support society depend upon a reliable 
flow of power to function.  A relatively new invention in the history of humanity, people 
have quickly come to rely on the electrical energy produced and transported by the power 
grid on a daily basis.  This lucrative and indispensable industry has recently become a 
more commonly suggested target for both physical and cyber attack due to society’s 
dependence on it.  Attacks on the system are likely to be the work of professionals, 
accomplished by organized crime and state-sponsored terrorist or military groups [18].   
Environmental problems also afflict this complex system and previous research 
efforts typically focused on improving system stability, security, and reliability with 
respect to these types of issues.  Power system companies are integrating more networked 
communications into their corporate and control systems because it provides them with 
additional information to make better business and system control decisions and has 
become economical to do so.  As the strain on existing grid systems continues to increase 
and more attention is given to network based attacks on the system, some research efforts 
have shifted to the cyber security needs of power systems typically revolving around 
identity credentials and policy-based trust as discussed in [5].   
Real-time information requirements have presented some difficulties in fully 
utilizing the security benefits that these trust systems offer, warranting further study into 
other layered protection mechanisms.  Additionally, modernization will increase network 
reliance, necessitating this investigation into using reputation-based trust to improve 
T 
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system coordination.  This chapter on related literature is broken into four main parts.  
The first describes the electrical grid and gives some insight into why interest in its 
security is increasing.  The second part describes current grid protections mechanisms 
and research efforts to transition to a more decentralized networked protection 
environment.  The third section reviews the use of trust as a measure of communications 
reliability and how collaborative trust has been applied in existing peer-to-peer networks.  
The final section covers the increased need for cyber security in SCADA systems. 
2.1  Background on the Power Grid 
Electric power has been generated commercially since the late 1800’s and has 
constantly been under a state of expansion and interconnection.  The three primary 
reasons for this expansion as stated in [40] include benefits from economies of scale, 
improved load factor and increased generation reserves.  Together, these three factors 
have helped make electricity more affordable and reliable for a greater number of people.  
A basic understanding of electricity, the main components in a power grid and a history 
of system vulnerabilities is essential to understanding the current requirement for 
modernization. 
2.1.1  Electricity, the Fundamentals 
There are four basic descriptors used when discussing electricity in power 
systems [40].  The first term is voltage.  Voltage (V) refers to the difference in electric 
potential and can be expressed as one Joule of energy that is needed to move one 
Coulomb of electrical charge.  Differences in electric potential cause charge to flow 
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through a line.  The second descriptor current (I) describes the rate of this flow and is 
measured in amperes in which one ampere is one Coulomb per second.  These two terms 
are often referred to together when using Ohm’s Law given as 
V IR      (2.1) 
where V is the voltage, I is the current, and R is the resistance (the third term).  
Resistance is determined by the characteristics of the material through which the current 
flows and is measured in ohms.  Increasing resistance in series (longer transmission lines) 
increases the overall resistance where as increasing in parallel (increased aggregate load) 
decreases the overall resistance [40].  Thus there is a linear relationship between voltage 
and current that depends upon the resistance.  For a given voltage, if the resistance 
decreases the current should increase.  This is particularly evident in ground shorts where 
an excessive current typically engages protection mechanisms to isolate the fault and 
prevent circuit damage. 
The potential for transmission line damage can be explained by resistive heating 
as discussed in [40].  Heat is measured in energy per unit time as is referred to as power 
(P), our fourth term.  Power is most often generally referred to by the equation 
 P IV  (2.2) 
which describes power as current multiplied by voltage and results in a measure of watts 
or Joules per second.  Using Ohm’s Law, this equation 2.2 may also be rewritten as   
 
2P I R  (2.3) 
to more clearly show the relationship between current, resistance, and power.   
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This relationship is significant when discussing changes that occur in different 
parts of the systems.  As a rule, current and resistance cannot be adjusted independently 
[40].  This relationship can come into play in two distinct types of scenarios.  First, in 
some circumstances such as in home usage, voltage is held constant.  Decreasing circuit 
resistance causes current to increase and since the current term is squared, current has 
more of an impact on the power than the resistance.  In the second scenario more 
applicable to transmission and distribution line design, current is held constant with 
respect to the power lines and is dependent upon the aggregate end loads.  Since power 
losses from resistive heating are not desired, line resistance should ideally be minimized.  
The selection of a conductor for use as a line material is important since tradeoffs exist 
between performance and cost.  This selection must account for topography as well.  As 
the power supply is increased during times of peak demand, current across the line 
increases, resulting in additional line heating.  This resistive heating can result in line sag 
that is associated with a primary cause of short circuits and their resultant power outages. 
The four terms previously discussed do not encompass all power system 
descriptors require for system protection.  There are additional characteristics associated 
with alternating current (AC) that need explanation.  AC was selected for use in power 
systems due to the ease of using transformers to raise and lower voltages, optimizing 
energy conservation.  Higher voltages prevented transmission losses, but lower voltages 
were needed for safer end-use applications.  AC is traditionally depicted as a sine wave.  
The current reverses direction twice each cycle at a frequency that has been standardized 
at 60 cycles per second in the US. 
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The two most significant characteristics associated with AC systems are reactance 
(X) and impedance (Z).  Reactance is associated with the ability to oppose the current 
flow and is either classified as inductive if it resists changes in current or capacitive if it 
resists changes in voltage.  If there is any reactance, there will be a phase shift between 
the voltage and the current sine waves.  This reactance measure is combined with 
resistance to create a measure called impedance.  Impedance deals with the aggregated 
resistance or desire to flow and may be represented in complex number notation.  These 
two terms are used by protection mechanisms to determine fault conditions and location. 
2.1.2  Main Power Grid Components 
When analyzing the state of a power grid and its ability to balance power 
requirements, researchers typically divide the grid into segments based on function.  The 
electric power grid is comprised of four major components (as seen in Figure 1) that 
work in harmony to deliver a consistent supply of power exactly when and where it is 
needed.  The first part of the power grid is the generation capability.  The source of 
power used in generation can come from many different resources, typically  
 
Figure 1. Basic depiction of typical electric grid components as described in [59] 
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acknowledged as coal, oil, or nuclear but now includes more green options such as wind 
and solar energy.  Regardless of the actual physical source, generation is involved with 
transforming that resource into electrical power.  Once in this form, it is able to be 
transformed (typically to a higher voltage) and transported to other regions. 
Now that the electrical voltage has been generated, it flows to other locations in 
the grid on the transmission system.  The transmission system is characterized by high-
voltage transmission lines generally recognized by tall steel towers.  It is used for 
transporting electricity over long distances using higher voltages to reduce line heating 
and resistive power losses as discussed in the previous section.   
Transmission systems connect geographically separated regions that may not have 
their own generation capability or need additional generation capabilities.  The US power 
grid is broken into three regions (as seen in Figure 2), each with its own generating and  
 
Figure 2. Three interconnections of North American power grid as described in [58] 
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transmission capabilities.  There are limited DC connections between these regions, but 
they are typically thought of as isolated grids among themselves.  As explained by NERC 
in [45], together the generation and transmission components comprise the bulk power 
system.  Bulk power is suitable for general purpose electrical operations, but additional 
conditioning is more likely needed for sensitive operations.   
The transmission systems in each grid are then linked to distribution systems at 
power substations.  The voltage is gradually stepped down to lower voltages that are 
generally considered safer and are more suitable for final customer use before being 
distributed to end users.  These distribution systems generally cover a smaller 
geographical region and may have been isolated from other regions at one time.  
Distribution systems cover the final portion of the journey from generation source to load 
destination. 
The final component in the electrical grid is the load or power demand.  
Individual loads are important for customers and billing components of power supply 
companies, however for planning purposes these individual loads are aggregated in terms 
of quantity and timing.  Individual loads are very dynamic, changing in both predictable 
and unpredictable cycles.  Planners are able to use these historical cycles along with 
current environmental and social data to try to balance generation to meet the required 
loads across the system (both typical and unexpected).  As loads increase, there is an 
increased likelihood of system overload if generating stations do not keep up with the 
growing demand.  The electricity generated for the power grid must be used almost 
immediately after it is produced.  It cannot be stored or routed as easily as other utilities 
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such as water, sewage or gas.  Electricity must be carefully monitored and controlled 
ensuring that the power generated meets the required loads.    
2.1.3  Monitoring and Control Systems 
Information systems that provide monitoring and control functions are the lifeline 
of the power industry.  They allow for responses necessary to provide the reliability and 
stability required to create an uninterrupted flow of power.  The power industry has made 
progress on modernizing its monitoring and control systems to improve performance and 
awareness of system status.  This progress has usually been done for the utility 
companies’ self interest.  Companies are able to capitalize on the interconnections 
between regions, trading power production capabilities to balance the overall system in 
the most cost-effective manner.  They are able to get feedback from the components in 
the system enabling more rapid reactions to periods of increased demand. 
Monitoring and control functions are provided by SCADA system components 
inserted throughout the grid.  SCADA systems generally provide centralized control and 
monitoring for a wide geographic region.  Devices read system data, automatically react 
to adverse conditions using protection devices and then typically report back to a system 
operator monitoring the overall system.  This operator can also make inputs to the system 
by adjusting or overriding automatic controls based on more complete situational 
knowledge.  These computer systems aggregate data to help build a complete picture of 
the system and improve situational awareness for operations personnel. 
The influential ability created by advanced control systems and recent integration 
of open communications systems such as the internet has made SCADA systems an 
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attractive target for cyber attacks [47].  The US government has focused attention on 
securing the components of its critical infrastructure against cyber and physical attacks in 
a series of publications between 1998 and 2010 that included presidential directives such 
as [9], [10], and [13] as well as planning documents [1] and [12]. 
2.2  Protecting the Electrical Grid 
Improving the reliability of electrical flow has often focused on improving the 
performance and security of power grid protection components.  One branch of research 
has focused on the improving communications networks and cyber-security.  Connection 
points between the utility networks and the rest of the internet can be secured using 
traditional mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection devices and cryptographic 
protocols [25].  This type of research has received a lot of attention as the government 
revealed evidence of foreign attempts at network mapping [19] and as cybercrime 
organizations threaten to breach network security from around the globe [62]. 
An alternate focus on grid protection has revolved around increasing system 
stability by improving fault clearing methods.  Fault clearing time is defined in [3] as the 
time necessary to identify a fault condition, make a decision about whether or not to take 
an action, and take the action to help isolate a section of the grid.  While there are many 
components that help provide this function, fault clearing is primarily dependent upon 
circuit breakers that physically open or close a circuit and the protective relays that help 
determine when a circuit breaker should operate and direct that operation [40].  This 
branch of research primarily looks at improving the interactions of physical devices such 
as circuit breakers and relays and the capability to provide human operators with 
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additional system knowledge or improved interfaces to make better decisions.  Research 
done in conjunction with this thesis has been accomplished with respect to this second 
focus on protection. 
2.2.1  Circuit Breakers 
 Circuit breakers open and close a circuit based on input from another device and 
rely on a form of energy to open and/or close.  When the breaker is closed, current is able 
to flow through the circuit.  When the breaker is opened, the flow of current is interrupted 
until the breaker is reclosed.  Breakers can be designed for different functions taking 
advantage of various mediums and their associated characteristics to terminate the 
electric flow.  The commands to open or close the breaker can be directed by a system 
operator in response to stability needs or may be generated by an automated monitoring 
device known as a protective relay in response to a fault condition.   
2.2.2  Transmission-Line Relay Protection 
A relay is the device that detects abnormal power conditions and signals a circuit 
breaker to interrupt the current [24].  There are a variety of relay types used in the power 
grid, each with a purpose specific to the protection needed.  Transmission lines are 
typically provided redundant protection and protection is needed from phase faults (faults 
between transmission lines) and ground faults (faults between a transmission line and a 
point of zero potential such as the ground or a tree) [40].  The distance relay and the 
differential relay as described in [24] and [53] provide the bulk of the protection from 
these types of faults for the transmission system. 
 15 
Distance protection relays use impedance measurements (as discussed in Section 
2.1.1) to determine if a fault is located within their protection zone.  The impedance of a 
transmission line is generally well known [24] and tested to verify reliable and expected 
performance.  Impedance is dependent upon the line material and construction.  
Impedance should stay consistent along the length of the line as long as the line type is 
the same allowing the location of the fault to be determined with a relatively high degree 
of accuracy.  If the impedance measurement falls into the fault zone that was established 
by system designers based on grid components and architecture, the relay will trigger the 
appropriate circuit breakers to open.  The research in this thesis focuses on this common 
type of transmission line protection. 
A second type of protection mechanism is often integrated into a protection 
scheme to detect other types of faults.  Differential protection is increasingly being used 
with relay communications methods such as pilot wire relaying to measure the difference 
in current at both ends of a transmission line.  Relays at each end of the line send and 
receive measurements from the opposite end of the line they are protecting.  Since the 
difference between measurements should be zero, the appropriate circuit breakers are 
tripped if the magnitude of difference is above a set value. 
2.2.3  Fault Clearing Using Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays 
Power circuit breakers and protective relays work in conjunction to provide 
autonomous monitoring and control functions necessary to clear fault conditions in power 
systems by interrupting the flow of power to a portion of the circuit [40].  Efforts to 
improve the operation of these devices have been ongoing since the 1950’s when 
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Kimbark described conditions required to rapidly clear faults from the power system 
[30].  More rapid fault clearing has a stabilizing effect by reducing the loss of 
synchronization and limiting the associated transient fluctuations. 
While faster fault clearing is essential, it is only one component of improving the 
system reliability.  Proper analysis of fault location and system conditions are just as 
vital.  This analysis enables the protective devices to clear the fault in a way that 
minimizes the effects caused when isolating a portion of the grid.  Relays must be 
sensitive and intelligent enough to select only the circuit breakers that need to open to 
clear the fault.  If too many circuit breakers are open (or if the area they cover 
encompasses too large a region) more loads will be disconnected from the generation 
devices.  It is typically better to take additional time to perform more complete analysis 
and open only the appropriate breakers than it is to open selected breakers as rapidly as 
possible. 
In order to gather the appropriate information necessary for this analysis, different 
types of protective relays have been installed in the electrical grid.  These different types 
help increase the selectivity of a relay.  Relay implementations as discussed in [36] have 
been integrated into different regions of the power grid accounting for what they are 
protecting and the type of protection that is required.  Generators require different 
safeguard mechanisms and settings than transmission lines do.  Backup systems require 
different settings than primary systems.  As the grid has been interconnected, improper 
settings have had a bigger impact and amplified the results of improper protection 
settings [59].   
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2.2.4  Interest in Relay Improvement from 2003 US Blackout 
The impact that improper relay settings can have on a system were brought to 
light from the findings following the August 2003 blackout affecting regions of the 
northeastern United States and portions of Canada [59].  Mismanaged relay settings were 
directly related to the cascading effects that caused the blackout to cover such a wide 
region.  The relays did not fail but operated as designed and intended according to their 
improper implementations.  Had system operators been able to mitigate one of the 
primary causes of the disturbance through better situational awareness, it is likely the 
cascade would not have occurred.  Better relay coordination may be able to prevent 
cascading effects in the future. 
After several lines isolated regions of the grid due to ground faults from contact 
with overgrown trees, the relay responsible for the cascade reacted to an overload 
situation as opposed to an actual ground fault [59].  The generation losses from the 
isolation coupled with the operator’s failure to reduce the overall load caused the relay’s 
power information readings to fall in the impedance zone.  The relay read the conditions 
as if it was experiencing a three-phase fault instead of an overload and its backup 
protection tripped the appropriate circuit breaker as it was designed to according to its 
settings. 
The findings released in that study recommended reviewing relay settings.  Many 
relays had been improperly configured or manufacturer preset configurations had not 
been adjusted for the current implementation and topography.  In particular, the 
committee acknowledged backup relays should normally be configured to check for 
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phase problems or fault conditions as opposed to overloads.  Overloads can often be 
short-term problems that occur as a system adjusts to fluctuations.  By triggering an 
improper circuit breaker trip in a situation such as this, these relays may spread the 
outage that they were attempting to contain. 
Additional interest in relay improvement was generated by two cascading 
blackouts that occurred in the European Union [60] and [61].  The 2003 blackout in Italy 
and the 2006 blackout originating in Germany both resulted in part from N-1 criteria not 
being met and from a lack of coordination with neighboring regions after multiple line 
trips caused power imbalances between the now isolated regions [60] and [61].  The N-1 
security rule as defined in [60] refers to the ability of a system to continue operations 
even if a single incident such as loss of a generation facility or transmission line occurs.  
It is aimed at preventing cascading effects.  Ultimately in both situations, those 
conditions were not met.  Findings indicated that better unified protection was needed for 
these increasingly interdependent systems and that relays operated incorrectly 15% of the 
time in the Italian blackout [60].  Increased relay research can help improve the 
coordination of protection efforts and improve system stability. 
2.2.5  Existing Relay Implementations in Backup Protection  
Currently, backup protection systems have been integrated into relay protection 
schemes to provide redundancy should the primary protection fail to operate.  Primary 
(zone 1) protection typically protects the first 85% of the line connected to a relay while 
backup (zone 3) systems cover a larger area [53].  Zone 2 protection can also be used to 
cover an area that encompasses the entire first line and a portion of the adjacent line [24].   
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Zone 3 systems provide multi-line protection, including the line that a relay is directly 
connected to as well as lines protected by adjacent neighbors [53].  As described in [59], 
some operators have stopped using zone 3 relays on high-voltage lines and reset zone 2 
relays to serve the purpose of a zone 3 relay.  For this research, zone 1 and zone 3 
protection regions were included as part of the protection scheme while the zone 2 region 
was not based on the coverage area.  These protection zones can be seen in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Transmission Line Relay Protection Zones.  Primary protection is provided by 
zone 1 coverage which protects approximately 85% of primary line while 
zone 3 coverage covers the primary line, and extends past 100% of adjacent 
line to provide backup protection for that line.  For example Relay 3 provides 
zone 1 coverage for line B and zone 3 coverage for line C.  Relay 4 would 
also provide zone 1 coverage for line B but zone 3 coverage for line A instead 
since it is directional.  Relay 1 and relay 6 would provide zone 3 coverage for 
line B.  A zone 2 protection scheme (not shown) would extend past the zone 1 
coverage, but would be less than zone 3 coverage area.  [53] 
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When a fault occurs, the fault location and actions taken by other relays will determine if 
a relay needs to take action.  Using direct communications between relays to coordinate 
circuit breaker opening at both ends of a transmission line as in pilot schemes [7], 
designers are able to create a more effective protection scheme. 
This electrical fault protection has increased in importance as current systems are 
stressed to their limits [58].  Transmission line protection mechanisms are of crucial 
importance to the protection of the entire grid.  Designers must give proper consideration 
to relay settings when creating primary and backup protection schemes.  Both the line 
length and its relative importance in connecting geographically dispersed generating 
locations with destination loads determine the characteristics required for planning proper 
operation of the protection systems.  Benefits of using schemes with increased relay 
coordination such as pilot schemes must be weighed against the decreasing costs of these 
more resource intensive systems. 
2.2.6  Proposed Agent-based Backup Protection for Transmission Lines 
As costs for more advanced communications networks continues to decline, 
researchers have proposed replacing traditional protective relays with relay Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IED) [64] that provide increased protective capabilities.  In this 
research, an agent was defined to be a software component able to interact and act 
autonomously based on the results of its interactions.  The IED’s that were created would 
be able to read power system information and react to that information.  They would also 
share information with neighboring nodes to include passing along any protective actions 
that they have taken.   
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This agent-based approach would fit into the current monitoring and control 
scheme and could pass information to a master control center as well.  It would allow 
agents to use remotely acquired information to make more correct decisions locally.  
Preliminary research as shown in [64] has demonstrated that this agent-based protection 
scheme has the ability to clear electrical ground fault conditions more rapidly, while still 
allowing the system to analyze the complete set of information required when making 
protection decisions.  The agents work together cooperatively as described in [14] to 
provide protection according to a preauthorized set of rules. 
2.2.7  Current Wide Area Agent Implementations in the Power System 
The additional computing power provided by integrating intelligent agents in a 
system such as this is of additional benefit in a SCADA scheme when compared to 
traditional relay implementations.  Agent-based relay research has also been initiated for 
adaptive relay schemes.  These schemes provide protection that changes with the external 
environment based on feedback from other parts of the system. 
New power systems in China have already been incorporating agents to provide 
features such as this as described in [11] and [70].  These agent implementations enable 
communications between relays and central servers.  The agents assist in fault protection 
using additional data gathered through collaboration.  This increased information 
requirement entails more inter-device communications, necessitating additional methods 
to secure the information exchanges.  This security is likely to come through network 
protection mechanisms such as cryptography and firewalls as well as other tools 
described in [6]. 
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2.3  Increased Need For Cyber Security and Better Information Sharing 
2.3.1  SCADA Modernization Efforts and Security Impacts 
Since the mid 1990’s, the evolution and modernization of electrical grid control 
mechanisms have attracted attention in the cyber security community.  Computer-based 
control systems were introduced to provide more advanced computational power and 
better data processing.  Digital technologies resulted in improved information handling 
and provided operators with automated, coordinated options to aid their decision-making 
abilities.  Systems typically revolved around a centralized computer located in a control 
center that would communicate with remote system components over a wide area 
network.  The resulting systems are much more capable and interoperable, but have also 
made the systems more vulnerable to exploitation from malware, hackers, and cyber 
attack [55].   
Modernization is necessary for improved grid stability and information sharing.  
The increased situational awareness enables operators to create flexible response options 
to prevent outages and minimize disruptions.  The additional protection requirements 
when integrating interoperable components are likely to increase security and reliability 
of the system as a whole.  The previous practice of security by obscurity goes against 
Kerchkhoff’s principle that states that the system design should not require secrecy to 
function securely [29].  Believing proprietary technology is a security measure works 
only until the specifications are discovered.  Once discovered, the system becomes more 
vulnerable and can be exploited more easily, often without notice. 
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2.3.2  Communication Needs for Grid Modernization 
Security needs continue to increase as the interdependence of the electric grid and 
communications systems grows more complex.  New information transactions are 
occurring to provide operators, customers and providers with the information they require 
to make effective, timely decisions.  The current infrastructure is mostly based off 
internet protocol (IP) technology to provide the required real-time information transfers.  
IP-based technologies such as transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram 
protocol (UDP) are used to for information exchanges and have enabled the use of 
extensible markup language (XML) tagging to help with data format issues [54].   
As discussed in [57], IP provides basic address identification information to help 
route information transfers from one point in a network to another.  It helps identify 
components and lets them talk to each other.  TCP is a connection-oriented protocol 
designed for reliable communication between two nodes in a network.  It guarantees that 
all the data will be received in the correct order.  UDP on the other hand is connectionless 
and does not provide for error correction or guaranteed delivery.  It does however provide 
for more rapid data delivery as a connection does not need to be established.  It also has a 
lower overhead since less information needs to be transferred in each given message.  
These conditions make UDP the fastest and least complicated way to transmit data 
resulting in its use for most real-time applications.  XML standardizes the data format 
and creates tags that help applications identify and exchange information in an 
interoperable manner [54].  It has helped synchronize database information and enabled 
data sharing for new and innovative purposes. 
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2.3.3  The Smart Grid Transition and New Threats 
These improvements in network and tagging abilities have helped shape the path 
towards incorporating technology to improve grid reliability and optimize energy 
generation and distribution.  The most significant challenge in moving towards this goal 
is protecting the information that will be required to improve grid awareness and make 
optimizing decisions.  Interconnections will be incorporated in new devices that make 
power control decisions based on preference information that may be pulled from 
financial databases.  Security measures will need to be implemented cooperatively to 
protect the system as a whole from cyber and physical threats. 
Attacks against electric utilities are becoming more attractive due to the effects 
that can be created.  Customer databases are large and contain financial and personal 
information.  These systems receive more cyber security attention than control equipment 
because they are more closely related to corporate networks.  However, as researchers 
look towards the transition, the security focus is becoming more encompassing.  In [55], 
Shaw writes that directly controlling switch equipment and transformers is the biggest 
threat to grid stability.  Protective relays are positioned at locations where they have the 
potential to interrupt failures from spreading and cascading.  More advanced relays have 
more complex communications needs and thus require a different level of protection than 
they originally did.   
If access to relays is granted, hackers would be able to directly control breaker 
actions and protection settings.  As the age of the Smart Grid approaches where 
information is widely shared, it is likely that relays at remote locations will link to the 
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control and corporate networks to allow remote status checking and setting adjustment.  
Additional layers of security such as trust measurements from behavior observation can 
be used for distributed, autonomous protective actions that should help mitigate some of 
the effects if an intrusion were to occur and traditional protective schemes fail. 
2.4  Reputation-Based Trust and Agents in Distributed Systems 
 Researchers have acknowledged a need to secure networked SCADA 
communications in [14].  The inclusion of agents in these control systems using an 
autonomous information exchange implementation creates a P2P network among the 
intelligent agents.  Agents can learn who to interact with either at initialization or through 
topology discovery methods during routine operations.  Agents can interact through 
communication to determine the reliability of other agents.   
2.4.1  Using Trust to Measure Reliability of Distributed Communications 
The reliability of other agents could be tracked using a trust system.  Trust as a 
concept has been formalized by Dr. Stephen Marsh in [35] where he described it as a 
degree of confidence in information obtained from a known or unknown source when the 
outcome of a decision using that information is uncertain.  Trust is also a central concern 
in many multi-agent distributed systems where agents base decisions on information 
obtained from other agents.  This information can be obtained directly, indirectly, or with 
some combination of methods as discussed in [51]. 
When implementing a trust system, to aid in decision making agents need to put a 
value on information obtained from others using a trust metric, where a trust metric is 
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defined as system measurements used to quantify the reliability of other agents.  This 
value can come in the form of user satisfaction scores common in e-commerce situations 
and in P2P systems.  Typically, P2P systems are thought of as file-sharing systems such 
as Gnutella, Kazaa, and BitTorrent or communications systems such as Skype.  A typical 
problem in these P2P networks is that there is a lack of accountability due to the 
anonymous nature of the network and the potential for misuse is increased based on that 
anonymity.  Ensuring appropriate peer behavior using trust management systems has 
been discussed in papers such as [5], [33], [42], [51], and [65].   
Trust as described in these systems generally is based off of policy, reputation or 
a combination of these descriptors.  Trust can be established at the individual or system 
level.  It can be subjective and is subject to change, making an extensive record of 
historical actions not necessarily representative of future performance.  The time period 
that must be tracked is dependent upon the system, the type of protection, and tolerance 
that is acceptable.  Policy-based trust is implemented in networks using credentials such 
as passwords or keys and often provides access control functions as described in [5].   
Combining policy-based trust with reputation-based trust is becoming more common as 
suggested in [33] and [39].   
2.4.2  Reputation-Based Collaborative Trust Systems 
In reputation-based trust systems, there are a variety of methods for computing 
and storing trust.  Trust is usually based off of a trust value that is dependent upon a 
history of interactions that are rated on a scale of success.  Trust can either be calculated 
by directly tracking interactions or expanded to create a more system-wide view by 
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accepting the values created by another node.  While typically used in implementations 
for online file-sharing or e-business rating systems, these reputation-based schemes can 
play a part in helping improve the overall security when implementing agent-based 
protective measures in the power grid.  The intelligent agent computing power could be 
harnessed for distributed trust calculations.  
Decentralized trust computations take the burden off a centralized server and take 
advantage of resources that exist in the system.  Agents have immediate access to 
knowledge and can share information when required, minimizing the distance that data 
requests have to travel over the network.  Theses local trust values can be aggregated 
where necessary to improve a single agent’s overall view of the network.   
One such system, described in [28] is called EigenTrust.  This system focuses on 
using both direct and indirect experiences to calculate a trust value using a concept 
known as transitive trust.  Peers rate other peers with whom they have had a direct 
interaction.  To expand their view, these trust values are exchanged with other peers in 
order to aggregate ratings and reevaluate peers or provide a peer with a trust value 
indirectly.  It continues spreading information this way to spread trust values globally 
throughout the system. 
A second collaborative reputation-based trust system, Project NICE, was 
developed at the University of Maryland for decentralized applications using shared 
resources.   Lee, Sherwood and Bhattacharjee worked on establishing a distributed 
scheme for trust inference in P2P networks at UMD that efficiently stored user reputation 
information in a distributed manner [32].  Their work focused on a decentralized trust 
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inference scheme that could be used to infer trust across an arbitrary number of levels 
while requiring a limited amount of storage at each node.  Agents created local trust 
values using the algorithm they deemed appropriate. 
2.4.3 Explanation of the Trust System Used in this Research 
The trust system implementation used in this research was inspired by the work 
done for Project NICE.  As described by Lee in [32], the NICE platform was used for 
cooperative distributed applications.  In the original implementation, applications using 
this protocol bartered resource certificates to gain access to remote services. 
The idea behind this certificate exchange was that agents could redeem issued 
certificates at a later time to receive resources or storage as a payment scheme.  The 
NICE protocol used network communications to share information and exchange 
certificates required for trust decisions.  There are three main steps in a typical 
implementation.  First, an agent advertises the resources it has to offer and its location.  
Second, an agent needing resources arranges bartering and trading of resource 
certificates.  Finally, a distributed trust valuation is accomplished based on the results of 
the transaction, creating a value for the interacting nodes.   
Depending on the computing resources available and implementation desired, 
trust values can be stored either locally or remotely (or a combination of methods can be 
used).  As discussed in [32] each method has its own advantages and disadvantages.  
Remote storage of trust values typically requires a public key system to digitally sign 
trust and identity information using a hash algorithm creating a trust cookie in the 
process.  In contrast, local storage methods reduce the communications requirements and 
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can reduce some of the time needed for the verification associated with the sending and 
retrieval of trust values.   
These methods of distributed reputation-based trust management can be 
successfully applied in an agent-based power system protection scheme.  When 
integrated with other forms of traditional network protection, they are an essential 
component helping add security and reliability to the data exchanges.  This additional 
layer of trust verification can help operators identify behavior-based anomalies rapidly 
for time-sensitive critical infrastructure protection. 
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III.  Methodology 
HIS chapter presents an original methodology for integrating reputation-based 
cooperative trust as an additional layer of security for backup protection systems.  
The new agent scheme integrates behavioral-based analysis with an agent-based 
protection scheme.  Independent, distributed intelligent agents can use the reputation 
information from this analysis to improve decision-making and responses.  The data 
obtained while observing the behavior of cooperating agents can also be used to make a 
judgment regarding the reliability of any information obtained from the observed agent. 
There are three main goals for this chapter.  First, this chapter will describe the 
approach taken to integrate the peer-to-peer cooperative trust scheme that was adapted for 
use in this agent-based protection environment.  Second, it explains the simulation setup 
and the methodology that was selected to obtain significant and meaningful results by 
describing the integrated model and tools upon which this research was based.  Third, it 
reviews the original malicious simulation scenarios that a particular implementation of 
the cooperative trust scheme could encounter and explains the experimental parameters 
used in this agent-based backup protection system.   
 3.1  Research Objectives 
As described in Chapter II, it is essential that protection systems implement relay 
settings appropriate for the situation and operating conditions.  Research has shown that 
intelligent agents embedded into protective components such as relays have the ability to 
add system stability [64].  This stability is gained as agents acquire remote information ad 
assemble it into a more complete situational picture to make an increased number of 
T 
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correct decisions more rapidly than traditional methods allow, especially when exposed 
to a more open communications network.   
The transition to a more interconnected Smart Grid requires additional 
information sharing to help improve system operator situational awareness.  Agents have 
the ability to analyze information and behavior improving this awareness.  The 
information can be exchanged between central systems and protection agents to enable 
operators to remotely review system status and settings and make complementary 
adjustments that support those made automatically by the agents.  This improved system 
awareness will prevent situational lapses that often result in cascading outages. 
Grid transformation requires a renewed focus on cyber security due to the 
increased reliance on the communications infrastructure.  Modernization necessitates 
evaluating component vulnerabilities.  Solutions to protect against exploitation need to 
increase security while maintaining interoperability and real-time data exchange.  
Traditional network security measures need to be modified to meet time restrictions and 
typically introduce unacceptable delays into the system.  The proposed agent-based 
protection scheme integrates a reputation-based trust system that provides behavioral-
based analysis with limited overhead. 
A reputation-based trust system was integrated with an intelligent agent designed 
to be compatible with work accomplished in [64] enabling the new agent to perform 
additional analysis of other agent behavior.  The new agent’s success was determined by 
performance comparison with the original agent scheme and with traditional protection 
mechanisms during times of malicious communications to validate the hypothesis that the 
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reputation-based trust component could clear faults no slower than traditional protection 
mechanisms and produce a higher percentage of correct behaviors than the agent-based 
scheme originally proposed in [64]. 
Performance of the new trust agent was measured through simulation by 
comparing the time needed to clear an electrical fault condition using the backup 
protection provided by the new agent incorporating the trust scheme with the time 
associated with traditional zone 3 distance relay settings that are traditionally on the order 
of one second [24].  To account for the effects of malicious behavior, the correctness of 
the agent actions were also annotated and compared with the actions taken by the original 
agent created in [64].  The definition for correct behavior was adapted from performance 
classifications given in [7].  A correct decision was defined by an agent disregarding 
fraudulent messages and not extending the isolated portion of the grid beyond what was 
required to clear the fault. 
3.2  Collaborative, Reputation-Based Trust Approach 
3.2.1  Trust Implementation for Protection Agent 
For this project, a simplified implementation of the NICE algorithm was 
implemented based around stand-alone simulator code provided by Lee [32] for an 
extended paper at http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/nice/.  The modified implementation 
maintained most of the capabilities that were proposed by the original research, but 
minimized the traffic that needed to be exchanged between nodes by using local trust 
storage.  Due to the unique and predictable message traffic that would be sent throughout 
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the agent protection system, many of the values could be standardized by message type.  
Other features were adjusted to fit this unique application.   
The authors recommended that remote storage be used to add some protection 
from denial-of-service attacks.  This forces the requesting node to prove their trust to the 
serving node and prevents malicious nodes from forcing agents to search other peers for a 
non-existent trust value.  Limiting the agents with whom communications are allowed to 
a specific subgroup reduced the need for this type of protection in this agent 
implementation. 
Initial experimentation using this trust algorithm was designed to take advantage 
of local trust computation and storage.  Trust valuations were not shared throughout the 
system to create global trust values and the scheme was designed to operate without 
cookie exchanges to reduce message size and network traffic.  In fact, no additional 
communications were exchanged between agents.  This format replicated Wang’s 
original experimental results from [64] while validating the trust computation methods.  
Nodes would not share trust information in this setup, nor could they replace untrusted 
nodes with trusted ones. 
3.2.2  Agent Communications Topology 
Agent nodes were arranged in a structure created for joint system protection and 
were statically arranged to communicate with a preselected set of neighbors.  This 
arrangement ensured communications with agents who would traditionally provide safety 
should protection efforts fall back on non-agent methods if communications were 
interrupted or terminated.  In this implementation, agents would not be able to form 
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cliques only with other highly trusted agents as it could leave gaps in protective coverage.  
Agents have to be more selective in choosing trusted agents from their limited agent pool, 
basing decisions around the established topology as well as the trust metrics. 
Preset communications were established for a given agent with three distinct 
groups.  The first group consisted of any other agent sharing primary protection of the 
line.  The second group was more extensive.  This group included agents who augmented 
the primary protection by providing backup protection for that same line segment.  The 
third group consisted of any intermediary agents located between the original agent and 
agents providing backup protection who were not responsible for protecting that given 
line segment.  
Agent communications were then broken into two components.  The first 
component was agent communications with the local power system interface which will 
be described in more detail in Section 3.2.3.  The second component was agent-agent 
communications described in Section 3.2.4.  These two components were used in 
conjunction to first obtain local power system conditions and then send that information 
to an agent belonging to one of the specified groups. 
3.2.3  Communications Between Agents and Power System 
Agent interactions with the power system included three types of messages.  The 
first two types were a query and response for local state information.  In response to a 
query, the agent obtained voltage and current measurements for each of the three phases 
of electric power as well as fault indications for the primary and backup protection zone 
and any primary or backup signals sent to the breaker directing a trip.  The third 
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classification was a message to the breaker directing a breaker trip or directing the 
breaker to block the previously observed trip signal.  The information obtained from the 
power system was temporarily stored to be exchanged with other agents. 
3.2.4  Agent-Agent Communications 
Communications messages between agents were classified as one of three types 
as well.  The first two types were considered routine.  First, each time period agents 
queried other agents for conditions at the remote location with information query 
messages.  Second, agents would respond to a query by sending the local data that was 
obtained from their power system query using an information response message.  The last 
type of message exchanged between agents was the set equipment message.  It was 
intended to be used when an agent was unable to clear a fault itself.  This message was 
defined as an advisory message to another agent that local protection mechanisms failed 
and coordinated help was necessary to clear the fault condition from a remote location. 
The information query and response messages were sent to each agent with whom 
communications were preselected.  This included the other primary agents, backup 
agents, and any intermediary agents.  The set equipment messages were originally limited 
to the neighboring agent in either direction, but could be expanded to include the next 
logical agent in line depending upon the conditions and trust implementation that was 
selected.  Reputation information was not exchanged between agents in this 
implementation.  Trust metrics were based on direct observations.  An inherited trust 
scheme that relied on referral information from others as described by [5] could 
potentially be integrated, but is not necessary and generates additional problems. 
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3.2.5  Cycle of Repeated Agent/Power System Interactions 
Wang’s original experiments were replicated after incorporating the NICE-
inspired trust computation and storage system.  In the simulations in [64], agents 
primarily communicated only with their immediate neighbors responsible for the shared 
protection of a line segment.  This was expanded for use in the improved trust system as 
described in the previous section to better enable fault and system state verification. 
Agent communications occurred in a cycle where the local power system 
conditions were first obtained.  The agent then checked response messages that were 
received to determine if other agents detected any fault conditions.  Agents used this 
information to verify if agent behavior matched known malicious activity and identified 
bad agents.  Next, each agent responded to any messages querying for remote system or 
verified and reacted to set equipment messages.  Finally, it queried all agents in the 
applicable protection regions for current state information and waited for responses.   
3.2.6  Trust Metric Computations 
In this new research designed to expand upon the work in [64], trust between 
agents was based on the interactions from status queries and the applicable response 
messages to focus on agent availability as opposed to message integrity.  Observed 
behavior was also compared against predefined conditions that were used to identify 
malicious agents.  Behaviors such as improperly sending set equipment messages or 
failing to trip a breaker when conditions warranted a trip were used to define malicious 
agents.  Other implementations could be created that would not only depend on the 
frequency of communications, but also on comparisons of remote readings with local 
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measurements to include a measure of quality or correctness into the rating.  For 
simplicity, this implementation only validated remote readings when sending or receiving 
set equipment messages.   
The simple example in Figure 4 demonstrates how trust metrics are developed and 
maintained for a pair of communicating neighboring nodes.  The number of query (Q) 
messages sent and responses (R) received are tracked for each agent with whom 
communications has been directed, in this case agents 4 and 5.  A successful interaction, 
defined as a response to a query message, is stored as a 1.  An unsuccessful interaction is 
stored as a 0.  A trust rating is then calculated for each individual agent by dividing the 
number of responses received by the number of queries sent as 
# ( 100 )
# ( 100 )
responses received in last time steps
Trust rating
queries sent in last time steps
  (3.1) 
These computations result in a trust rating for each paired agent between 0 and 1.  A 
positive rating represents an agent that is trusted to some degree.  A higher ratio of 
successful interactions equated to a higher trust rating for that neighbor.  An agent that is 
not trusted will be classified as bad using additional analysis, in which case it will receive 
a discontinuous rating of -1.  Behavior resulting in a classification of bad can be seen in 
Table 1.  This table is used to check for malicious behavior and can be tailored for a 
specific implementation to create the desired effects by adjusting the restrictions. 
Table 1. Observed Behavioral Conditions Used to Classify an Agent as Bad 
Condition # Behavior 
1 
Agent sends false set equipment messages  
(in excess of the established threshold of 3 in the last 0.05 seconds) 
2 Agent trip action fails during valid fault conditions 
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Agent 4 Agent 5 
Time:  0.014 
R 1 1 0 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 4:  0.75 
Time:  0.014 
R 0 1 0 0 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 5:  0.25 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Time:  0.012 
R 1 0 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 4:  0.75 
Time:  0.012 
R 0 0 1 0 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 5:  0.25 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Query sent 
Time:  0.010 
R 0 1 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 4:  0.75 
Time:  0.010 
R 0 1 1 0 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 5:  0.5 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Query sent 
Time:  0.008 
R 1 1 1 0 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 4:  0.75 
Time:  0.008 
R 1 1 1 0 
Q 1 1 1 1 
Trust of 5:  0.75 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Time:  0.006 
R 1 1 0 0 
Q 1 1 1 0 
Trust of 4:  0.667 
Time:  0.006 
R 1 1 0 0 
Q 1 1 1 0 
Trust of 5:  0.667 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Time:  0.004 
R 1 0 0 0 
Q 1 1 0 0 
Trust of 4:  0.5 
Time:  0.004 
R 1 0 0 0 
Q 1 1 0 0 
Trust of 5:  0.5 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Reply sent;  Query sent 
Time:  0.002 
R 0 0 0 0 
Q 1 0 0 0 
Trust of 4:  0 
Time:  0.002 
R 0 0 0 0 
Q 1 0 0 0 
Trust of 5:  0 
Query sent 
Query sent 
Time:  0.000 
R 0 0 0 0 
Q 0 0 0 0 
Trust of 4:  0 
Time:  0.000 
R 0 0 0 0 
Q 0 0 0 0 
Trust of 5:  0 
Figure 4. Example of trust computations:  Shows seven information exchanges.  
Demonstrates how completed information exchanges are tracked to arrive 
at a current value of trust for a neighboring node. 
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The data an agent uses to compute trust values must be timely.  In the simulations, 
request and response messages were sent approximately every 2 milliseconds.  Older data 
in the trust computation is replaced with more recent data using a sliding window 
scheme.  As shown in Figure 4, agents start with a trust value of 0 and slowly build trust 
by responding to data query messages as shown from the time period from 0.000 to 
0.008.  In the provided example, Agent 5 stops sending response messages from time 
0.010 to 0.012 causing its trust valuation to be lowered.  This lack of reliable 
communication indicates that it may not perform as expected during critical situations. 
Ideally, agents want to respond to every query message, achieving the maximum 
trust rating of 1.  Realistically, a trust rating of close to 1 is all that can typically be 
achieved due to the time delay required for message propagation.  Unless an agent stops 
communication (which is not likely during normal operation) it will repeatedly send 
information queries (one each time period) as opposed to a scheme where an agent must 
wait for a response before sending its next query.  In this manner, an agent will always 
have an outstanding query that has not yet been answered, resulting in an optimal trust 
rating lower than the theoretical maximum.   
3.2.7  Reducing Trust and Using the Trust Metrics 
Trust valuations are lowered if agents stop responding to information requests.  
Agents may stop responding to requests due to issues such as communication failure or 
interference, internal faults of either the sending or receiving agent, programmed 
behavior (malicious or benign) or a variety of other issues.  Trust values may also be 
lowered if communications meet specified preprogrammed conditions such as sending 
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conflicting information, advertising faults when none actually exist or failing to take 
proper corrective actions.  The trust values are then used when an agent sends or receives 
a message to or from another agent directing different equipment settings to assess that 
information source or destination.  An agent with a trust value above the threshold can be 
assumed to be acting in the best interest of the protection system, whereas an agent with a 
rating below the cutoff can be assumed to have an issue with providing reliable 
information updates and thus protection.  The information received from an agent below 
the threshold should be considered more carefully before it is acted upon.  
The scheme must also be able to classify an agent with whom it has previously 
interacted as a bad agent.  In this implementation, an agent classified as bad will receive a 
trust rating of -1 to indicate that it is not trusted and distinguish it from an agent with 
whom communications have not been established or were terminated using the behaviors 
depicted in Table 1.  This rating is based on behavior and verification of message content 
and overrides the independent calculations associated with responding to queries.  While 
this classification can be made for many reasons, an agent must consider the decision 
carefully before making this assignment.  In some cases, the scheme may not be able to 
distinguish whether the agent is malicious or faulty, however there would still be benefit 
in reverting to an alternate protection scheme.   
This implementation does not implement a procedure to recover from a bad 
classification.  This is primarily due to the fact that maintenance would be required to 
either fix the protection components or the software at the remote location.  An out of 
band process is recommended to reset the system after corrective actions are completed. 
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3.2.8  Decision Matrix Guiding Agent Behavior 
To gain insight as to how the trust system would help the agents make decisions 
under different scenarios, a mechanism for detecting and responding to observed 
abnormal behavior was developed.  The rule set that was proposed in [64] was modified 
to account for the addition of trust information and behavior analysis.  The modified rules 
are presented as Table 2.  This is similar to the rule set that helps guide alerts in an 
Intrusion Detection System.  The agents needed guidance to react in a manner so as to 
increase the overall protection of the system under a majority of the test scenarios 
depicting both normal and abnormal system conditions. 
The matrix detailed a set of rules that can be described using conditional statements.  If a 
certain condition was met, one action was taken; if not met, a different action was taken.  
The rules now incorporate results from trust computation as additional conditions that 
must be satisfied to help decide which actions should be taken.  Additionally, the rules 
were modified to let an agent adjust trust levels and classify and agent as bad if the 
observed behavior matched conditions specified in Table 1. 
3.3  Collaborative Agent-based Protection System Simulation Tools 
This research focused on integrating cooperative, reputation-based trust to support 
the agent-based scheme used for transmission system protection in [64].  The research 
presented here built upon the original experiments that show compact trip zone coverage 
and simultaneously reduced fault clearing time as presented in that research.  The 
experiments covered here were run using the Electric Power and Communication  
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Table 2. Decision Matrix for Agent Behavior:  Trust Inclusive Agent-Based Protection 
Scheme Modified from [64] (original rules shaded, trust changes in italics) 
Rule 
No. 
Situation If… Then… Action 
1 
The relay 
sends a trip 
signal  
(to local CB 
indicating a 
zone 1 fault 
was detected) 
there are no corresponding zone 3 relay 
operations in the agent’s transmission 
region of concern from trusted agents 
and trusted agents exist 
the relay sent an 
incorrect trip signal 
Stop the breaker trip 
any of the trusted relays in the concerned 
region send a validated trip signal 
the relay sent a correct 
trip signal 
Monitor the breaker for 
operational failure – Adjust relay 
trust levels if necessary 
another situation occurs 
Situation is Uncertain 
1 
Continue to Rule 2 
2 Uncertain 1 
there is a fault in the zone 1 protection 
zone 
there was a correct 
relay trip 
Monitor the breaker for 
operational failure – Adjust relay 
trust levels if necessary 
there is not a fault in the zone 1 
protection zone 
there was an incorrect 
relay trip 
Prevent the breaker from 
tripping – Continue to monitor 
for fault conditions and adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
3 
The relay 
sends a trip 
signal  
(to local CB 
indicating a 
zone 3 fault 
was detected) 
at least one trusted agent indicates a zone 
1 relay trip in the concerned region 
the relay operated 
correctly, continue to 
trip if fault is not 
cleared in allotted time 
Monitor the breaker for 
operational failure – Adjust relay 
trust levels if necessary 
there was no zone 1 relay trips from 
trusted agents in the concerned region 
Situation is Uncertain 
2 
Continue to Rule 4 
4 Uncertain 2 
there is a fault in the zone 1 protection 
zone 
there was a local relay 
failure 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
there is a fault in the zone 3 protection 
zone 
there was a remote 
relay failure 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
there is not a fault in the zone 3 
protection zone 
there was an incorrect 
zone 3 relay operation 
Stop the breaker trip – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
5 
Operational 
failure of 
breaker is 
noted 
breaker fails to operate correctly in time 
allotted 
the breaker is 
malfunctioning and not 
providing local 
protection 
Send set equipment notification 
messages to the agents in the 
concerned region 
6 
A set 
equipment 
notification 
message is 
received when 
relay 
operations are 
in progress 
message is received from adjacent agent 
in same direction as indicated fault and 
trusted agents verified fault conditions  
remote breaker failure 
occurred in agent’s 
protection zone 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
message is received from adjacent agent 
in opposite direction as indicated fault 
and fault conditions are verified with 
trusted agents in that direction 
remote breaker failure 
occurred outside 
agent’s protection zone 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
message is received from a more distant / 
non-trusted agent or fault is not verified 
Situation is Uncertain 
3 
Continue to Rule 8 
7 
A set 
equipment 
notification 
message is 
received when 
no relay 
operations are 
in progress 
message is received from a trusted agent 
and fault conditions are verified with 
trusted agents in appropriate direction 
remote breaker failure 
occurred 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures –  Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
message is received from an agent who is 
not trusted 
Situation is Uncertain 
3 
Continue to Rule 8 
8 Uncertain 3 
fault conditions are identified/verified 
and any time delay to allow intermediate 
agents to clear the fault has passed 
possible remote relay 
and breaker failures 
Trip the breaker and monitor the 
breaker for failures – Adjust 
relay trust levels if necessary 
fault conditions are not 
identified/verified when time delay has 
expired 
there is no fault in the 
system, invalid 
message 
No control action is required – 
Adjust relay trust levels if 
necessary 
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Synchronizing Simulator (EPOCHS) to synchronize the Power System Computer Aided 
Design (PSCAD) power system simulator and the NS2 network simulator as seen in 
Figure 5. 
3.3.1  EPOCHS 
In order to model the complex relationships between the electric power infrastructure and 
communications networks, a simulation tool needs to combine information from different 
Figure 5. EPOCHS infrastructure:  Depicting interactions between the NS2 
communications simulator, the PSCAD/EMTDC power simulator and the 
EPOCHS agents.  The Runtime Infrastructure (RTI) is a central interface 
location allowing for time synchronization and message passing [23] 
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systems to create one complete picture of the scenario.  Researchers at Cornell University 
developed EPOCHS to link power system simulations to communications simulators.  
EPOCHS uses an agent-based framework to combine different simulations using their 
built-in interfaces enabling communications events to be involved in other power 
scenarios. 
Hopkinson wrote that ―EPOCHS was designed to link multiple simulations into a 
distributed environment (federation)‖ [23].  Combining simulators is becoming more 
popular as an approach to model complex interconnected systems.  While standardization 
efforts are underway to enable better information sharing between simulators, many 
simulations include COTS products for which no source code is available.  EPOCHS’ use 
of agents helps combine information from both simulation systems, providing integration 
designed so that the simulations advance at the same clock rate.   
This technique enables researches to use the best simulator for their needs without 
sacrificing quality for the sake of interoperability.  EPOCHS used an agent headquarters 
and a run-time infrastructure as shown in Figure 5 to synchronize and coordinate 
simulations that would otherwise run at different speeds.  In this simulation, the EPOCHS 
agent headquarters synchronized the PSCAD simulator with the NS2 communications 
simulator to allow agents to communicate with each other and interact with the power 
simulation.   Time steps were set at 0.002 seconds for this follow-on experimentation. 
3.3.2  PSCAD/EMTDC 
PSCAD (Power System Computer Aided Design) is a commercial tool used to 
generate graphical representations of power systems for simulation use.  In conjunction 
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with the EMTDC (Electromagnetic Transients including DC), electro-magnetic transients 
simulation engine, these programs allow for the analysis of power systems during system 
disturbances.  They also allow parameters to be varied to simulate control actions taken 
in response to environmental changes.  By providing the user with time domain 
instantaneous responses (also known as electromagnetic transients) through a graphical 
user interface, these systems allow for better analysis and understanding than previous 
text only simulators [34]. 
PSCAD/EMTDC was used to create the transmission network and display system 
measurements during the experiments.  Measurement data and status values were 
exported to be used by the agents providing system protection.  The simulations were 
kept in synch using EPOCHS and communications between agents took place using NS2.  
This communications simulator provided the agents with a way to exchange information 
before interacting with the power simulator again.  
3.3.3  NS2 
NS2 (Network Simulator 2) is used to simulate discrete events for network 
simulation.  Development began in 1995 with support from Lawrence Berkeley Labs, 
Xerox PARC, University of California at Berkeley, and University of Southern California 
[46].  Due to the public availability of the source code, NS2 is widely used in research for 
large scale communications simulations and protocol investigation.  Coding is based 
around C++ for processing performance combined with Tcl scripts for simulation control.  
This split programming adds flexibility and separates mechanism from policy when 
designing simulations [8].   
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The implementation used for the experiments combined NS2, the RTI, the 
AgentHQ and agents into a single executable.  The ability to create protocol stubs within 
NS2 allowed the RTI to interface between the different components in a synchronized 
manner [8].  A single executable for these components provided performance 
enhancements compared to running additional programs.  The simulation required 
corresponding networks for both the power system and communications infrastructure. 
3.4  Experimental Environment  
A simplified transmission line network was created in PSCAD consisting of two power 
sources, one at either end separated by three substations and connected together by four 
transmission lines as depicted in Figure 6.  Every transmission line is protected with two 
circuit breakers.  The breakers are located at either end of the line and each is controlled 
by a distance relay.  The distance between substations is depicted in that figure as well 
since it is not shown to scale. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Simulated 400 kV power system used in the experiments:  Depicts a 
generation source at either end, four transmission lines, and eight circuit 
breakers (B1-B8), each protected by an IED relay (R1-R8) [23].  Transmission 
line lengths are provided since diagram is not to scale. 
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The original experiments in [64] were designed to protect a 400 kV high-voltage 
transmission system against a three-phase fault using distance protection methods.  In the 
simulations, request and response messages were sent approximately every 2 
milliseconds.  Communications between agents included measurements taken from 
current transformers, voltage transformers, and anti-aliasing filters.  Relay protection was 
provided by distance and time-delay relays using traditional settings.  The distance relays 
used the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to obtain inputs.  Experiments were conducted 
based on two different situations.  The first situation involved incorrect operation of a 
zone 1 relay.  In the second scenario, circuit breakers were designed to fail in the closed 
position, failing to open when directed by their respective relay. 
3.4.1  Original Communications Setup 
In the work done by Wang, agents communicated at a very simplified level and 
no background traffic was simulated, eliminating effects caused by network congestion.  
Each substation bus resulted in a one millisecond propagation delay added to 
communications.  The messages between agents consisted of requests for system state 
(voltage, current, breaker status, etc.) at another agent location, requests for an agent to 
set a breaker at their location and any applicable replies to those requests.  Agents would 
then make use of that information to collaboratively clear a fault in as small a region as 
possible.  Agent communications were limited to a node’s immediate neighbors or 
immediate neighbors plus an additional agent protecting the adjacent line.   
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3.4.2  Revised Communications Setup 
The revised communications setup for these experiments included a more 
complete range of agents to help coordinate protective actions.  Communications were 
needed with all agents responsible for providing zone 1 protection of the primary line and 
each adjacent line segment.  This allows agents to verify fault conditions in zone 1 
segments, zone 3 segments and adjacent line segments that it was not responsible for 
protecting based on the interactions with those agents.  Agents observing a zone 3 relay 
signal would monitor the appropriate agents responsible for primary protection to verify 
that they attempted to trip their local breakers and the success or failure of that trip.  They 
could use this data to observe whether the agent was working correctly or not and 
determine if they needed to take action.  This action could be accomplished without 
waiting the traditional amount of time to see the effects of the stabilization attempt at 
their location. 
Additionally, when trust was lost with an agent responsible for primary 
protection, the set equipment request could be sent to the next agent in line available to 
take protective actions.  The receiving agent had the option to either trip immediately or 
first verify that the fault was not actually cleared before tripping the breaker at their 
location.  If the fault was cleared by the agent who was believed to be untrustworthy, the 
agent would be exonerated otherwise they would be classified as bad.  By increasing the 
number of set equipment message recipients, the trust system improved clearing time. 
This and the original research are stepping stones for improved relay 
communications that could be incorporated into larger SCADA protection schemes.  
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During the transition to a Smart Grid, data retrieved from monitors and passed between 
agents could also be used to update the central control facility.  These updates would 
provide the system operator with additional details necessary for improved situational 
awareness.  The intelligent agent protection scheme forms the cooperative environment 
upon which the remainder of this research is based. 
3.5  Experimental Situation and Issue Requiring Backup Protection 
These revised rules from Table 2 that guide agent actions must remain applicable 
when using trust in the normal non-malicious environment and should enable the system 
to match the performance achieved in the original experiments.  This research first 
attempted to replicate the performance of the original agent-protection scheme using 
scenarios based around Wang’s second case in [64].  In this simulation set up, a fault was 
triggered at the midpoint of the line protected by Breaker 5 and Breaker 6 as shown in 
Figure 7.  A fault at a location such as this should be caught by the primary zone 1 
protection provided by relays 5 and 6 as well as the zone 3 backup protection from relays 
3 and 8. 
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Figure 7. Experimental transmission grid showing fault location:  Fault depicted at the 
midpoint between breaker 5 (B5) and breaker 6 (B6). 
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In this case, the relay providing signals to breaker 5 notices that the breaker fails 
to open and sends a trip signal to relay 4 to clear the fault by cutting out the smallest 
amount of line.  Relay 4 attempts to trip breaker 4.  Unfortunately, this breaker fails to 
open as well and relay 4 sends a signal to relay 3 to open that breaker.  Breaker 3 receives 
the signal from relay 3 and operates correctly, clearing the fault in less time than 
traditional protection measures would.  During the original experimentation, the fault was 
cleared at 0.188 seconds with the agent system as opposed to 1.592 seconds with a 
traditional relay backup protection system. 
The other case that was considered in [64] involved a false trip signal detected at 
Breaker 5.  The agent based scheme used the information from cooperating agents to 
block this false trip signal and prevent the breaker from opening.  The improved trust 
scheme must be able to continue to act correctly to this issue when subjected to malicious 
behavior.  Since protection capability is dependent upon communications from partner 
agents, the robustness of the trust scheme must continue to protect from false breaker 
trips even when information update messages are not sent by a neighboring agent or if 
they receive false set equipment requests.  This feature was tested using two scenarios.  
In one, Agent 4 did not send any message traffic to Agent 5.  In the second, Agent 4 sent 
false set equipment requests to Agent 5. 
3.6  Experimental Scenarios Used in the Analysis 
Additional experimental scenarios mimicking potential real-world issues that 
might be experienced were created to test the cooperative trust scheme.  Eight new  
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Table 3. Experimental Scenarios:  Non-Optimal/Malicious Agent Communications 
Scenario # Situation depicted 
1 Baseline case – no malicious behavior 
2 Agent 5 will not send information response messages 
3 Agent 5 will not send set equipment messages 
4 Agent 5 will not send information response or set equipment messages 
5 Agent 5 sends false set equipment messages 
6 Agent 4 will not send information response messages 
7 Agent 4 will not send set equipment messages 
8 Agent 4 will not send information response or set equipment messages 
9 Agent 4 sends false set equipment messages 
 
scenarios were developed, intended to mimic conditions that might be experienced by a 
protective agent.  These studies are based around a situation where a three-phase fault 
occurs between breakers 5 and 6.  Both breakers 5 and 4 will fail to operate when they 
receive a trip signal, however this information is not known to the agents until fault 
clearing is attempted.  These scenarios are presented in Table 3.  
In this research, a look at the overall system behavior was warranted since some 
individual relays were designed to fail.  To review, for these scenarios correct behavior 
was defined as tripping the breaker only when an actual fault condition exists and only 
isolating the minimum area between working breakers.  The baseline scenario was added 
to depict the normal communications environment.  The other scenarios replicated effects 
from some type of malicious activity aimed at interrupting or adding message traffic 
between agents.  There was not rule in Table 1 that used a lack of communication on its 
own to classify an agent as bad.  This was primarily due to the lack of a trust redemption 
mechanism.   
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3.7  Experimental Parameters Varied for the Trust System 
Different trust implementations were developed by varying some of the 
parameters involved with either trust computation or actions taken when trust was 
lowered or lost.  The experimental trust-based implementations were tested initially 
varying four parameters from Table 4 using a full factorial design for each of the first five 
scenarios from Table 3.  This was done to verify assumptions regarding the dependency 
between trust system thresholds and percentage of network traffic lost.  Final 
experimentation was accomplished using all nine scenarios and reducing the number of 
parameters to two by holding the number of interactions tracked constant at 100 using the 
sliding window scheme and the trust system threshold constant at 0.75.  Agents were 
initialized with a trust rating equal to the trust system threshold for this implementation.  
The results were compared with the non-trust-based agent system’s performance in each 
of those nine scenarios. 
The number of interactions tracked was kept rather small to ensure that only the 
most recent information was used to compute trust.  Protection mechanisms need to be 
 
Table 4. Trust System Parameters Varied in Experiments 
Level 
# of Interactions 
Tracked 
Trust System 
Threshold Value 
(0-1) 
Add additional 
breaker to trip 
list 
Likelihood 
network traffic 
is lost 
Low 50 .95 
When below 
trust threshold 
1% 
High 100 .75 
When an agent 
is classified as 
bad 
10% 
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responsive to system failures that may be hidden for long periods of time [38].  The trust 
system threshold values were selected based on the likelihood that network traffic was 
lost.  Previous research suggested a range of values for lost UDP traffic in a 
communications network with typical minimum values of 1% or less and maximum 
values of less that 10% [4], [15], [21], [26], and [69].  These figures will differ depending 
upon the type of underlying communications network supporting the protection plan as 
described in [43] and [52].  Current work is under way to investigate protection for these 
communication lines [49] and improve the communications reliability to provide better 
system protection [66]. 
3.8  Methodology Synopsis 
To summarize, this research will use simulation to conduct experiments 
integrating a reputation-based trust system with a proposed backup protection system for 
power networks revolving around agent-based communications.  The simulations will use 
EPOCHS to synchronize the inputs and outputs from the PSCAD/EMTDC power system 
simulator with the NS2 communications network simulator as described in [64].  Trust 
will be built between agents cooperating to provide backup protection through regular 
status query and response messages.  Information obtained from the response messages 
will assist in behavioral analysis and enable the agent to build a more complete picture of 
system events.  The trust system used in this protection scheme is inspired by the 
distributed model for Project NICE [32] using a modified implementation to take 
advantage of the unique situation posed by its application to the power system.   
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The scenarios designed for the experiments demonstrate the ability of the 
proposed trust-based protection system to provide more correct decisions than the 
original agent-based protection implementation when presented with behavior mimicking 
malicious activity as well as during normal operating conditions.  The reputation-based 
trust system will also enable more timely protective actions to take place.  In turn the 
additional analysis and improved system information is effective in preventing the 
stability problems that contribute to cascades, further improving upon the traditional 
distance relay protective mechanisms. 
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IV.  Results and Analysis 
HIS chapter presents results from the experimental simulations and an analysis of 
the impact from incorporating cooperative trust into a backup protection scheme 
for power transmission networks.  First, results from the initial inclusion of a trust 
monitoring system will be covered.  Second, investigative questions regarding the 
importance of different system characteristics and dependence of some variables will be 
examined.  Third, results from each of the scenarios used in the simulation experiments 
will be presented.  Finally, an overall analysis of the results will be given in the last 
section in this chapter. 
4.1  Initial Trust Monitoring Scheme 
Results from the experiments were favorable.  The first set of experiments was 
conducted to replicate the original results of Wang’s research while adding the 
appropriate trust structure.  The trust values were computed and stored however no 
actions were taken using the trust computation results.  This experimentation was done 
solely to provide information that could be used as part of a centralized control 
monitoring system providing system operators additional situational awareness about 
device status, network communications, and agent behavior.  The results demonstrate that 
the system could perform at least as well as the original system while documenting 
behavioral abnormalities and providing additional status information.   
In these case studies, the fault at 0.3 seconds between agent 5 and agent 6 caused 
agent 5 and agent 6 to properly detect a fault and send a signal to open their respective 
T 
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Figure 8. Fault clearing of agent-based protection system with trust scheme:  Initial 
experiment results showing the agent-based protection system with integrated 
cooperative trust able to replicate the results achieved in [64].  Fault at 0.3 
seconds cleared at 0.488 seconds by agent 3 and recognized by agent 5 at 
0.506 seconds. 
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circuit breaker as a result of primary protection trip signals as seen in Figure 8a.  The 
agent at relay 5 providing backup protection notices that the breaker does not open when 
provided with a proper signal. Agent 5 sends a set equipment message to agent 4 as seen 
in Figure 8b.  Agent 4 notices its breaker does not open and it sends another set 
equipment message to agent 3 as shown in Figure 8c.  Agent 3 is finally able to clear the 
fault at approximately 0.488 seconds as shown from the current readings at relay 5 graph 
in Figure 8d. 
The results of this initial test appear identical to the results used by the system 
without a trust component, because the trust information was gathered, but not used in 
decision analysis.  Unfortunately, this method of trust implementation would not add any 
additional assistance to the agent’s decision making capability since it was not used 
locally.  To be of use in this type of system, this trust data would need to be collected by 
a central monitoring station and interpreted there.  The impact created would improve the 
situational awareness of the operator and could help network analysis.  Any action to 
remedy the situation would have to be taken from his remote location.  Further 
experiments showed that more timely decisions were made if agents used these metrics 
autonomously for corrective actions.  They also showed using these trust metrics resulted 
in a higher percentage of correct decisions when faced with malicious activity. 
4.2  Investigative Questions Answered 
Prior to developing the final trust implementation this research examined the 
parameters that were selected and analyzed their impact on the experimental scenarios.  
In the second set of experiments, parameters were varied as depicted in Table 4 for the 
 58 
first five scenarios in Table 3.  The purpose of this round of experimentation was to 
verify the relative importance of each message type to the trust scheme.  By establishing 
a relationship between trust system settings and corresponding agent reactions, proper 
system settings were verified and experiments documented failures resulting from 
improper system setup.   
Results from these experiments showed that use of the trust system was effective 
in reducing fault clearing times when malicious activity was present in the system.  The 
original agent system typically reverted to traditional standby backup protection 
mechanisms (as used in non-agent based protection systems shown in Figure 9) when 
faced with a malicious situation that prevented authorized set equipment messages from  
 
Figure 9. Fault clearing of traditional transmission line backup protection:  Results from 
traditional transmission line backup protection system based off a time delay 
of 1.5 seconds as set in [64].  This is representative of the typical time it 
would take to clear a fault in most current implementations set on the order of 
1 second [24] and [59].  The agent system needed to provide better 
performance in both normal situations and during periods of malicious activity 
more closely approximating results achieved during normal activity and 
shown in Figure 8. 
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being sent.  When the original system was faced with situations where unauthorized set 
equipment messages were sent to agents, the lack of a mechanism to check the 
trustworthiness of the sender caused an immediate breaker trip without first observing or 
verifying fault indications. 
The modified agent-based protection system including the trust calculations was 
able to recognize an abnormal situation only when it caused a lack of trust.  If recognized, 
it could then react more quickly to the situation.  This established the first fundamental 
rule.  The system must be programmed to recognize and react to specific behaviors.  If a 
specific behavior or action was recognized as matching a condition described in Table 1, 
the agent was able to override the respective trust computation and distrust that agent 
completely.  A software based design allowed for the reprogramming of agents enabling 
their decision making abilities to be upgraded, assisting with adaptive protection 
capabilities. 
A second lesson learned dealt with properly setting threshold trust values used for 
agent classifications.  Original parameter settings causing situations where the actual trust 
rating was close to or below the trust threshold limit validated the assumption that 
additional information must be considered in certain circumstances such as monitoring to 
verify if an agent tripped or not.  Initial experiments simulating a 10% loss of message 
traffic and a trust threshold value of .95 required to classify an agent as good helped 
demonstrate the improper agent reactions.   
Although acting as programmed, an excessive number of agents were classified 
below the trust threshold.  Because they should have been trusted, extraneous set 
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equipment messages were sent into the system without proper reason.  Set equipment 
messages were originally limited to an agent’s immediate neighbors (one in each 
direction).  The new implementation included an option to send set equipment messages 
to the next logical agent in line as well, bypassing agents that did not meet the trust 
threshold.  These additional set equipment messages consumed communications 
bandwidth and forced agents to do more work, but improved protection.  This feature 
enabled the trust system to isolate the fault more rapidly and reliably while increasing the 
isolation area by the smallest amount.  However, without proper safeguards, these extra 
messages resulted in unnecessary circuit breaker trips that extending the recommended 
isolation zone.  When a message arrived from an agent that was more than one hop away, 
actions were delayed.  The more distant agent waited to verify the effect of any actions of 
the agent that did not meet the trust threshold to determine if an extended breaker 
opening was required. 
A third lesson was observed during this experimentation.  Normal information 
exchanges between agents established trust, but also verified remote agent actions.  In 
both systems, the set equipment messages were used to inform of a local protection 
problem.  However in the original system, the information from the response messages 
was only used to block a false local fault observation.  In the expanded trust system, 
information from remote agents was also used to verify fault conditions in multiple line 
segments to improve coordinated protection as well as for the trust calculations. 
When these response messages were lost, it directly affected the trust calculations 
and caused temporary periods where an agent acting in a trusted manner (and able to 
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clear faults) was incorrectly labeled with a low trust rating.  To fix this problem, instead 
of reacting solely on instantaneous information, the trust system was remodeled to 
incorporate recent power system state information from the last 0.01 second.  This 
accounted for a realistic degree of information loss in the system and improved data 
verification.  Additionally, set equipment messages were sent twice to increase the 
probability that they would reach their intended agent adding redundancy. 
Adding redundancy to communications networks in power control systems was 
recommended in [66] and [67].  Redundancy was added to the trust system fault 
verification modules ensuring that adjacent node status was not lost due to a temporary 
communication interruption or missed message using a sliding window to track signals 
and measurements from the past 0.01 seconds.  While communications redundancy is 
often thought of as creating multiple independent paths between nodes, the implemented 
method of resending and tracking recent information also created communications 
redundancy.  Agents validated local and remote power system settings more correctly 
after its incorporation better compensating for parameter simulating lost network traffic.  
It allowed for collaborating information that was obtained in different time slices while 
ensuring the relative timeliness of reactions to that information.  These changes added to 
the trust agent implementation prevented the isolation region from be expanded 
unnecessarily.   
These preliminary experiments also helped standardize trust system parameters 
used for the final set of experiments.  In the trust implementation, the trust threshold 
value was set accounting for at least twice the max expected value of a message being 
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lost.  Since the system relied on query and response messages, there were multiple 
opportunities for a complete trust transaction to be interrupted.  As a result in the final set 
of experiments, the trust threshold was established at .75, analytically accounting for the 
expected value of lost network traffic, expected propagation delay, and processing time 
associated with the agent communications.  This value limited the number of occasions 
when trust calculations accidentally fell below the threshold. 
Experimental results were similar when the number of tracked interactions was 
varied.  This was expected because the malicious scenarios evaluated in this research did 
not attempt to exploit this aspect of the trust scheme.  However in an actual 
implementation, the number of interactions tracked should be set according to the 
importance that minor fluctuations have on the system, the trust update mechanism 
selected, and the level of risk that an organization is willing to accept.  The fewer 
transactions tracked, the more rapidly temporary periods of communication interruption 
will be forgotten.  Trust will be lost and regained more quickly in this situation.  In the 
final experiments, tracked interactions were held constant at 100 resulting in a complete 
information refresh every 0.2 seconds as opposed to 0.1 seconds with 50 tracked 
interactions.  This value should be adjusted after identifying the risk to threats attempting 
to exploit reputation lag vulnerability [27].  More complex schemes that layer multiple 
trust ratings by tracking short and long time windows can help mitigate some of this risk. 
Additionally, it was noted that extending the list of agents to whom set equipment 
messages were sent only if an agent was classified as bad, was not as effective as an 
approach that relied also on the comparison of the calculated trust metric with the 
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threshold value.  Using solely the bad category limited the effectiveness of the system to 
only those situations that met a scripted preprogrammed behavior.  Loosening the 
restrictions and allowing the set messages to be sent to an extended set of recipients 
added robustness, but increased the computational cost at each extended recipient.  This 
new policy enabled bypassing agents who might be later classified as bad.  To prevent 
premature reactions to these messages, a time delay was added to prevent the more 
distant agent from opening a breaker without verifying that the fault was not cleared by 
the less trusted neighbor.  This delay was set at 0.05 seconds to account for the time 
required for that agent to open its breaker and stabilizing effects of clearing the fault to be 
noted in the voltage and current readings. 
Finally, signal verifications taking place between the interacting nodes enabled 
additional protection to be integrated into the system.  Agents were able to take action 
based on more immediate system feedback instead of waiting for timers to expire using 
traditional mechanisms.  They were able to directly compare readings and cross check 
these readings with set equipment requests.  This helped reduce the fault clearing time in 
certain situations improving system stability. 
4.3  Final Trust Scheme Results and Analysis 
In the final trust scheme that was created, the additional verification and 
redundancy integrated into the system resulted in a more successful trust system 
implementation providing additional protection in the face of malicious agents.  The trust  
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Table 5. Final set of parameters used for trust system experimentation and analysis 
Selected Trust Implementation 
# of 
Interactions 
Tracked 
Trust system 
threshold for 
good agents 
Likelihood 
network traffic is 
lost 
No Trust Scheme 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
1% 
10% 
Add additional breaker to trip 
list when computed trust value is 
below trust threshold 
100 .75 
1% 
10% 
Add additional breaker to trip 
list only after an agent is 
classified as bad 
100 .75 
1% 
10% 
 
system made correct decisions in all nine scenarios with the improved backup protection 
mechanisms clearing faults in less than 1.0 seconds in all cases regardless of whether 
breakers were added to the set list if they were below the trust threshold or only if they 
were classified as bad.  This was a significant improvement over the original agent 
scheme with no trust integration.  Table 5 shows the breakdown of parameters for 
experiments that were run for each scenario. 
4.3.1  Sign Test for Median 
Due to the relatively small sample size (25 simulation runs were accomplished at 
each experimental setup) it was not reasonable to expect that the underlying distribution 
was normal.  First, nonparametric methods were used to compare the median values 
obtained from experimentation using both the Sign Test for Median and the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test (Appendix A contains more detailed analytic results using reduced 
median times of 0.3 and 0.5 seconds that are closer to settings associated with zone 2 
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protection [24]).  For each of these tests, the null hypothesis states that the median trip 
time is greater than or equal to 1.092 seconds accounting for a recommended time delay 
on the order of 1.0 second [24] and [59].  The alternative hypothesis is that the median is 
less than 1.092 seconds.  In each of the scenarios, exactly 0 of the cases was observed to -
be greater than or equal to 1.092 seconds.  The observed value of each of the test 
statistics Q+ is 0.  It is assumed that the Q+ is binomially distributed with p=1/2 [41].  In 
this case n=25 and the P value is 0.000 [37], [50], and [68].  With a P value this small 
(less than our alpha of .05), we reject the null hypothesis.  There is strong statistical 
evidence that the improved trust scheme is able to reduce the time required to clear the 
fault. 
4.3.2  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Additional statistical significance is provided using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Test since our experimental results are reasonably symmetric.  In this test, a value for W 
of 0 was calculated again.  When W = 0 with 25 samples, the P value for this test is less 
than .005 [41].  This is too small to have occurred by chance.  As a result, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and it is statistically accurate to state that the improved agent-
based protection scheme integrated with cooperative, reputation-based trust metrics is 
able to clear faults more quickly than currently used traditional backup protection 
schemes.  In fact both sets of tests show that it is statistically correct to say the agent 
implementation can clear faults in less than 0.592 seconds and often less than the 0.392 
seconds more typical of a zone 2 relay when encountering the tested scenarios. 
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4.3.3  Significant Results Regarding Clearing Time and Correct Actions 
In six of the nine scenarios, the trust system improved results compared to the 
original agent-based system either by reducing clearing time (the original implementation 
reverted to traditional mechanisms in Scenarios 3, 4, 7, and 8) or by making improved 
decisions (not tripping solely based on receiving instructions to trip as in Scenarios 5 and 
9).  The most rapid clearing times were associated with the trust implementation that send 
additional set equipment messages if an agent dropped below the trust threshold at both 
1% and 10% traffic lost.  Had an additional rule been added to classify an agent as bad if 
their trust dropped below a lower threshold, the times might have been improved for the 
alternate scheme where additional agents were sent set equipment messages only if they 
were identified as bad.  This would have added to the complexity of the rule set and had 
the potential to classify agents as bad without any malicious activity having occurred. 
4.3.4  Results From Original Agent-Based Protection Scheme with No Trust 
The original agent scheme that did not incorporate a trust scheme was used as a 
reference point to compare the effectiveness of the different trust implementations versus 
what occurred when the original agent system faced these scenarios.  In the scenarios 
revolving around set equipment messages being lost (Scenarios 3, 4, 7, and 8), the non-
trust agent implementation reverted to traditional relay backup mechanisms as seen in 
Figure 10.  This resulted in the fault being cleared at the pre-established time delay set for 
the backup protection (1.5 seconds), reducing the benefits of a communicating agent 
system.  Additionally, because trusted relationships were assumed, there were incorrect  
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Figure 10. Fault clearing times using original scheme without trust mechanism:  
Comparison of fault clearing times (with a 99% confidence interval) between 
traditional backup protection and the original agent based scheme that did not 
incorporate a trust mechanism. 
 68 
responses observed in Scenarios 5 and 9.  In these instances, as soon as an agent received 
a set equipment message from a neighbor, it attempted to trip its breaker immediately 
isolating regions of the power grid unnecessarily.  As a result, in 22.2% of the scenarios, 
there was an incorrect response and in 44.4% of the scenarios the system reverted to 
traditional backup protection resulting in non-optimal decisions being made in 66.7% of 
the situations. 
4.3.5  Results From Trust Implementation 1 (Agent Below Good Threshold) 
In contrast, the trust implementations that created an extended net of recipients for 
set equipment messages did not revert to the traditional backup protection mode and did 
not trip when extraneous trip signals were sent.  Specifically, the best implementation 
was the one that sent set equipment messages to the next agent in line if an agent that was 
supposed to receive a set equipment message fell below the established trust threshold for 
good classification.  The improved trust scheme was able to better identify fault location 
and clear the fault based on the expanded set of information that it was able to obtain and 
analyze.  By interacting with all agents responsible for protecting the specified segment 
of transmission line, an agent was more likely to verify any zone 1 or zone 3 fault signals 
that were observed.   
By verifying these signals, the agent was able to adapt to malicious behavior and 
reduce clearing time as shown in Figure 11.  Signal verification was used to cross 
reference readings from multiple locations and remote current measurements were used 
to prevent creating an isolation zone that was larger than required.  These verifications, 
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Figure 11. Fault clearing times:  set messages extended if below threshold.  Fault 
clearing times with a 99% confidence interval for agent implementation where 
set equipment messages are sent to an extended set of recipients if trust metric 
is below established threshold.  Scenario 1 – Normal communications through 
Scenario 9 – Agent 4 sends false set msgs are listed. 
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lengthened the overall time to clear the fault compared to normal communications 
situations but the tradeoff in ensuring that breakers did not trip unnecessarily was worth 
the delay.  
The difference in performance with the original system was obvious especially 
when comparing Scenarios 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9.  The difference in performance with the 
second trust implementation where the set of agents receiving set equipment messages 
was only extended when an agent was classified as bad was less noticable.  During the 
worst case scenario when 10% of message traffic was lost the difference in performance 
was limited to being statistically significant only during Scenario 8.  Under more normal 
operating characteristics (1% of message traffic lost) however, the differences were 
noticable under both Scenarios 4 and 8.  This tradeoff requiring weighing additional 
verification and programming versus fault clearing time must be determined by the user 
selecting the implementation and the computing resources they have available. 
In Scenarios 2, 4, 6, and 8, trust levels were properly established at lower levels 
for the agent that was not responding properly to information queries.  In Scenarios 2 and 
6, that agent did send a set equipment message when it realized that it was broken 
enabling a response time more closely aligned with the time established in the baseline 
Scenario 1 where no malicious behavior occurred.  In Scenarios 3 and 7, the agent was 
trusted but refused to send set equipment messages.  The agents were able to compensate, 
but clearing time took longer than normal and longer than the time required when the 
respective agents were identified by lower trust metrics.  In Scenarios 5 and 9, the agents 
who knowingly tried to send improper set equipment messages were appropriately 
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labeled as malicious, the continued set equipment messages were ignored and actions 
were taken accordingly and appropriately when a valid fault signal was received.  Faults 
were cleared after the appropriate signals were verified as valid using multiple sources.  
In other situations where agents were identified as not acting in accords with proper 
behavior, the system had the option to label them as malicious when this behavior was 
noted, enabling better response actions in the future.  
4.3.6  Results From Trust Implementation 2 (Agent Classified as Bad) 
In the alternate trust implementation that reduced the occasions where set 
equipment messages were sent to an extended net of agent to those when conditions led 
to an agent’s classification as bad, results were similar to the previous trust 
implementation.  It outperformed the original agent-based scheme as well as traditional 
backup protection mechanisms as shown in Figure 12.  The only occasions when these 
extended set equipment messages were sent were during Scenarios 5 and 9.  As a result, 
the only real statistical difference between this implementation and the previous trust 
implementation that had fewer restrictions on extending the set equipment message list 
was found from experiments done with Scenarios 4 and 8 where trust was lost and the 
agent did not try to let others know that it experienced failure and needed protection help. 
4.3.7  Results for Alternate Cases Requiring Blocking a False Signal 
The second protection case involving Breaker 5 receiving a false signal to trip 
again produced favorable results for the reputation-based agent protection system.  When  
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Figure 12. Fault clearing times:  set messages extended if agent classified as bad.  Fault 
clearing times with a 99% confidence interval for agent implementation where 
set equipment messages are sent to an extended set of recipients if agent is 
classified as bad. Scenario 1 ―Normal communications‖ through Scenario 9 
―Agent 4 sends false set msgs‖ are listed. 
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experiments were run using either of the two trust implementations, the false trip signal 
was successfully blocked and power continued to flow.  This was a result of ensuring that 
agents who were not trusted did not delay protection efforts.  Waiting for untrusted agent 
information either caused too long of a delay or resulted in an incorrect decision being 
made.  The non-agent based detection scheme is not prepared for this situation and would 
trip a breaker as shown in Figure 13.  The original agent scheme that did not incorporate  
 
Figure 13. Original agent system trips breaker due to false signal.  Shows false trip signal 
sent to Breaker 5 at 0.20 seconds (a).  Relay 5 failed to block the false signal 
in graph (b) resulting in the breaker tripping and stopping the current flow 
seen in graph (c). 
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this trust component was unable to successfully react to the situations where information 
updates were not sent from a neighboring agent and when the neighboring agent sent 
false signals to trip the breaker.  In the situation where communications were interrupted, 
the breaker tripped as it would in the non-agent system [64] as shown in Figure 13.  In 
the other situation, the breaker tripped immediately after the agent received the false set 
equipment message because it did not verify the lack of a fault condition.  The reputation 
based cooperative trust scheme met the protection condition established in [64] by 
continuing to allow current to flow (as shown in Figure 14) under abnormal 
communications conditions and when subjected to malicious agent actions.   
  
 
Figure 14. Correct blocking of false trip signal with the trust system.  When a false trip 
signal was sent to Breaker 5 at 0.20 seconds, Agent 5 is rapidly able to block 
Breaker 5 from tripping using information from trusted agents to ensure the 
current continued to flow. 
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4.4  Summary 
As discussed in the Chapter II, cyber security measures and improved situational 
awareness are going to be essential as the grid undergoes modernization.  Malicious 
activity is on the rise and hackers have already demonstrated their ability to access the 
networks of companies around the world.  Because elements of critical infrastructure 
provide essential services, they become high-priority targets.   
The reputation-based trust mechanism proposed by this research has shown its 
effectiveness in reducing fault clearing times compared to traditional protection 
mechanisms.  These mechanisms need to be prepared to make correct decisions in the 
face of potential malicious activity.  By comparing fault clearing times, the agent-based 
backup protection systems incorporating the trust component are more effective at 
providing protection than systems without this component.  A summary graph comparing 
the results of all experiments performed is included as Figure 15 and Figure 16.  The 
experiments showed that trust implementations reduced clearing times below 0.5 seconds 
under each of the selected scenarios, well below the traditionally established settings of 1 
to 2 seconds [24] and [59].  These agent based systems even cleared faults more rapidly 
that the 0.3 seconds normally associated with zone 2 relays [24] under normal conditions 
and often even when subjected to malicious behavior. 
The suggested implementations should be combined with traditional network 
security measures and physical security efforts to provide proper defenses.  If improperly 
applied, this enhanced protection has the potential to disrupt time-critical protection   
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Figure 15. Fault clearing time summary at 1% message traffic loss.  For traditional relays 
fault clearing times were constant, set with a 1.5 second operating time.  The 
original agent-based scheme significantly reduced the clearing time but in 
certain cases reverted to traditional protection methods or operated 
incorrectly.  The improved agent-based schemes suggested in this research 
compensated for malicious behavior and cleared the fault in a shorter time 
period without extending the isolation zone at 1% message traffic loss. 
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Figure 16.  Fault clearing time summary at 10% message traffic loss.  For traditional 
relays fault clearing times were constant, set with a 1.5 second operating time.  
The original agent-based scheme significantly reduced the clearing time but in 
certain cases reverted to traditional protection methods or operated 
incorrectly.  The improved agent-based schemes suggested in this research 
compensated for malicious behavior and cleared the fault in a shorter time 
period without extending the isolation zone at 10% message traffic loss. 
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devices by adding delays where none previously existed.  While delays are better than 
interrupted or miscommunications in many instances, in the power grid they are 
unacceptable.  Adding behavioral-based analytic methods for trust metric calculation aids 
in ensuring information reliability and improves resulting system stability. 
 Layering an additional collaborative protection scheme as suggested by this 
research, increased the security of the entire control system.  This scheme can make use 
of existing computing and network resources to provide additional information necessary 
for making proper protection decisions and improving the situational awareness of 
control operators.  Agents used reputation information as a criterion for judging the 
trustworthiness of information received during data transactions and will have the ability 
to send this additional information to control centers for data analysis.  This analysis can 
monitor the protection system for signs indicating a faulty agent or possible larger system 
attack. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
HIS thesis investigated the proposal that integrating reputation-based cooperative 
trust as an additional layer of security for backup protection systems would 
improve system performance and awareness.  The proposed scheme significantly reduced 
the amount of time required to clear faults when backup protection use was necessary and 
made a higher percentage of correct decisions compared to the original agent-based 
scheme that did not include a trust component.  As grid modernization continues and 
more intelligent devices are integrated into the SCADA control systems, incorporating 
reputation-based trust systems into these devices has the potential to be of great benefit in 
improving the reliability, stability, and security of this element of our critical 
infrastructure. 
This chapter will first summarize results obtained from the multiple experimental 
simulations and cover conclusions that can be drawn.  Next, it will emphasize why this 
research needed to be accomplished and how it will impact and change the power control 
community.  Finally, it will cover recommendations for future research topics in this area. 
5.1  Conclusions of Research 
Initial findings from the reputation-based trust integration with agent-based 
backup protection are very promising.  Even in its simplest implementation, the trust 
system has the ability to provide additional information to monitoring or control centers 
while adding little overhead and achieving identical performance to systems that did not 
implement trust.  The additional information captured provides valuable feedback for 
T 
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evaluating the state of the system and creating improved awareness of networks and 
component behavior. 
The potential for a more robust implementation is even greater and has been 
demonstrated using the specific scenarios discussed in this research.  When faced with 
malicious behavior that is not stopped with traditional network protection measures, the 
trust system will account for malicious activity determined by behavioral analysis.  The 
trust system enabled more rapid fault clearing (greater than a 50% improvement) without 
increasing the isolated grid area to help prevent outages from cascading.  Transmission 
line protection must account for malicious activity such as denial of service and rogue 
control commands in the future.  While a trust-based system will not protect from every 
type of attack, it has shown to be effective without adding a lot of communications 
overhead.  Layering trust mechanisms with other defensive elements will help architects 
design more complete grid protection. 
5.2  Significance of Research 
The incredible power afforded one who is able to affect relay or other switching 
device behavior results from the direct control that they possess on critical power 
delivery equipment.  These components are located at key junctures that have the 
potential to affect multitudes of people.  They are designed to break a chain of power 
failures and must act responsively and properly.  The additional trust layer is invaluable 
in limiting the effect an attacker has on this vital equipment.  
The Air Force, Department of Defense and other governmental agencies can 
benefit from this research that applied reputation-based trust in a unique cooperative 
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environment.  Power and other utility networks are increasingly the subject of attack [19], 
[20], [22], and [56].  Trust systems have the potential to thwart attempts to compromise 
these systems.  Threats to the power grid and other elements of critical infrastructure are 
likely to occur during times of war preparation such as the mobilization and deployment 
phases [44].  Interviews and writings in [16] and [31] describe how disruption to 
information systems and supporting infrastructure could cause delays and backlogs at key 
logistics locations.  Other research [63] focused specifically on attack strategies designed 
to introduce cascade style effects into the power grid.  Improving the reliability and 
security of the grid protection elements and the underlying communications networks 
will have a direct impact on the ability of the US armed forces to continue to deploy and 
rapidly project force where needed anywhere around the globe. 
The additional information tracked by the trust system is definitely of benefit in a 
layered security infrastructure.  Trust metrics provides insight about system behavior that 
was not previously captured.  As grid modernization progresses, the behavioral-based 
analysis that this type of system provides can be similarly implemented in other smart 
components that connect corporate and control information systems.  Regardless of how 
monitoring and control is accomplished in future SCADA systems, network designers 
take connectivity information into account and allow control operators to make adaptive 
adjustments from both environmental conditions and the trust metrics. 
5.3  Recommendations for Future Research 
A protection system implementing this additional measure of information 
reliability will realize additional benefits as widely distributed intelligent agents work 
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together to ensure system stability.  Research should continue to develop protection 
settings tailored for specific applications for further validation.  The trust-inclusive, 
agent-based backup protection system proposed here is a first step towards improving the 
robustness of agent-based protection and should be incorporated into future protection 
architectures. 
This research has the potential to be expanded in a number of directions.  In the 
future, the first logical step should focus on expanding the decision making capabilities to 
include scenarios where more than one agent may be malicious.  Additional information 
validation methods will need to be incorporated into the system.  The current 
implementation focused on cross-referencing power system data with locality data to 
clear the fault in a manner that affects the smallest area should be continued.  Creating 
more complex network topologies will help validate the system’s performance when 
faced with a more interconnected grid structure and ensure actions continue to limit the 
isolation area.  This system has the potential to be incorporated into the electrical grid on 
a wider basis.  Expanding the trust computations to include additional data validation as 
well as its implementation in more decision scenarios will help create a more robust 
scheme. 
Another step might be to investigate this or an alternate reputation-based trust 
scheme implemented in conjunction with a policy-based trust scheme such as 
cryptography.  When used together, the system could take advantage of additional layers 
of security.  If the coding is optimized, some of the other distributed aspects of the trust 
computations such as increased validation using shared trust cookies as discussed in [32] 
 83 
could be integrated.  This combined scheme should improve protection without adding 
additional network traffic beyond what is required for the cryptographic system.  A 
digitally signed cryptographic token can then be incorporated allowing for distributed 
cookie storage or trust metric calculations.  The more robust implementation can permit 
additional trust inheritance and global trust value computations while improving message 
authentication and decreasing the potential for successful message spoofing. 
A final direction that future research could take would be to incorporate a 
reputation-based trust system such as this into other smart devices that will be 
increasingly used in the next generation grid.  Devices will have the potential to be used 
in demand reduction schemes and would allow end users to be directly wired into the 
central control scheme.  In these schemes it would be more desirable that a device 
respond appropriately when needed.  The time delays associated with cryptographic 
encoding have less of an impact on system protection since the real-time requirement is 
less stringent.  A trust-based scheme would have the potential to select the most 
trustworthy devices in these cases to ensure that proper actions could be directed in a 
timely manner to create the appropriate system effects. 
5.4  Summary 
Information and cyber security are becoming more essential our critical 
infrastructure network protection every day.  In a recent 60 Minutes interview, the former 
US Chief of National Intelligence reported, ―If I were an attacker… I probably would 
sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a 
cascading effect‖ [1].  Proper relay operation is critical to ensuring that this does not 
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occur.  Without better communications methods and protection schemes, malicious users 
would be able to create effects that could plunge entire regions into darkness and instigate 
chaos.  Traditional security mechanisms must be augmented by additional measures such 
as trust verification that provide adaptive protection capabilities for these components 
that provide an essential service to society. 
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Appendix A.  Experimentation Results By Scenario 
Table 6. Performance statistics for Scenario 1 – no malicious behavior.  Approximately 
equal performance for all implementations. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
0.188 0.20096 0.18808 0.18544 0.18808 0.18848 
Maximum (s) 0.188 0.292 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
Median (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
Minimum (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.188 0.188 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.03173 0.00040 0.00508 0.00040 0.00087 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.00635 0.00008 0.00102 0.00008 0.00017 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.01775 0.00022 0.00284 0.00022 0.00049 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
0.188 0.18321 0.18786 0.18260 0.18786 0.18799 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
0.188 0.21871 0.18830 0.18828 0.18830 0.18897 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 7. Performance statistics for Scenario 2 – Agent 5 does not send response 
messages.  Approximately equal performance for all implementations. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
0.188 0.21904 0.176 0.17736 0.18808 0.18856 
Maximum (s) 0.188 0.408 0.176 0.188 0.19 0.19 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.178 0.188 0.19 
Median (s) 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.176 0.188 0.188 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.176 0.188 0.188 
Minimum (s) 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.176 0.188 0.188 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.06180 0.00000 0.00250 0.00040 0.00092 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.01236 0.00000 0.00050 0.00008 0.00018 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.03457 0.00000 0.00140 0.00022 0.00051 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
0.18800 0.18447 0.17600 0.17596 0.18786 0.18805 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
0.18800 0.25361 0.17600 0.17876 0.18830 0.18907 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
0 
0.005 
1 
.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 8. Performance statistics for Scenario 3 – Agent 5 will not send set equipment 
messages.  Trust implementations outperform original agent implementation. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
1.592 1.592 0.3784 0.33856 0.3784 0.39176 
Maximum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.382 0.402 0.382 0.402 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.396 0.378 0.396 
Median (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.39 0.378 0.39 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.228 0.378 0.388 
Minimum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.226 0.378 0.382 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.00000 0.00100 0.07693 0.00100 0.00601 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00020 0.01539 0.00020 0.00120 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00056 0.04303 0.00056 0.00336 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.37784 0.29553 0.37784 0.38840 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.37896 0.38159 0.37896 0.39512 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
25 25 0 10 0 12 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.2122 0.0 0.5 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
91 
.025 - .05 
0 
0.005 
160 
unable to 
reject 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
25 25 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 9. Performance statistics for Scenario 4 – Agent 5 will not send information 
response or set equipment messages.  Trust implementations outperform 
original agent implementation. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
1.592 1.592 0.22608 0.25304 0.38408 0.44888 
Maximum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.228 0.454 0.394 0.5 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.226 0.228 0.386 0.456 
Median (s) 1.592 1.592 0.226 0.226 0.384 0.448 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.226 0.226 0.382 0.44 
Minimum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.226 0.226 0.378 0.414 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.00000 0.00040 0.07253 0.00363 0.01776 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00008 0.01451 0.00073 0.00355 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00022 0.04057 0.00203 0.00993 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.22586 0.21247 0.38205 0.43895 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.22630 0.29361 0.38611 0.45881 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
25 25 0 3 1 25 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0001 0.0 1.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
6 
0.005 
1 
0.005 
325 
unable to 
reject 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
25 25 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 10. Performance statistics for Scenario 5 – Agent 5 sends false set equipment 
messages.  Trust implementations outperform original agent implementation.  
Original implementation tripped without valid fault condition. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
n/a n/a 0.22608 0.22864 0.22608 0.23512 
Maximum (s) n/a n/a 0.228 0.284 0.228 0.39 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) n/a n/a 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 
Median (s) n/a n/a 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 
1
st
 Quartile (s) n/a n/a 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 
Minimum (s) n/a n/a 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 
Sample Std Dev n/a n/a 0.00040 0.01156 0.00040 0.03427 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error n/a n/a 0.00008 0.00231 0.00008 0.00685 
99.5% Error n/a n/a 0.00022 0.00647 0.00022 0.01917 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
n/a n/a 0.22586 0.22217 0.22586 0.21595 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
n/a n/a 0.22630 0.23511 0.22630 0.25429 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
n/a n/a 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
n/a n/a 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 11. Performance statistics for Scenario 6 – Agent 4 does not send response 
messages.  Approximately equal performance for all implementations. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
0.19216 0.21624 0.188 0.186 0.188 0.18872 
Maximum (s) 0.292 0.396 0.188 0.192 0.188 0.19 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.246 0.188 0.19 0.188 0.19 
Median (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
Minimum (s) 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.176 0.188 0.188 
Sample Std Dev 0.02080 0.05074 0.00000 0.00548 0.00000 0.00098 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00416 0.01015 0.00000 0.00110 0.00000 0.00020 
99.5% Error 0.01164 0.02838 0.00000 0.00306 0.00000 0.00055 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
0.18052 0.18786 0.18800 0.18294 0.18800 0.18817 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
0.20380 0.24462 0.18800 0.18906 0.18800 0.18927 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
0 
0.005 
1 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592s 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 12. Performance statistics for Scenario 7 – Agent 4 does not send set equipment 
messages.  Trust implementations outperform original implementation. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
1.592 1.592 0.3784 0.342 0.3784 0.38992 
Maximum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.382 0.4 0.382 0.402 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.394 0.378 0.394 
Median (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.388 0.378 0.388 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.288 0.378 0.386 
Minimum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.378 0.226 0.378 0.378 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.00000 0.00100 0.06811 0.00100 0.00593 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00020 0.01362 0.00020 0.00119 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00056 0.03810 0.00056 0.00332 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.37784 0.30390 0.37784 0.38660 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
1.59200 1.59200 0.37896 0.38010 0.37896 0.39324 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
25 25 0 9 0 9 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.1148 0.0 0.1148 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
60.5 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
97 
.025 – 0.05 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
25 25 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 13. Performance statistics for Scenario 8 – Agent 4 does not send response or set 
equipment messages.  Trust implementations outperform original 
implementation. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.2356 0.37848 0.39064 
Maximum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.24 0.38 0.408 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.238 0.378 0.394 
Median (s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.238 0.378 0.39 
1
st
 Quartile (s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.238 0.378 0.386 
Minimum (s) 1.592 1.592 0.238 0.226 0.378 0.382 
Sample Std Dev 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00500 0.00087 0.00610 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00100 0.00017 0.00122 
99.5% Error 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00280 0.00049 0.00341 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 1.59200 1.59200 0.23800 0.23280 0.37799 0.38723 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 1.59200 1.59200 0.23800 0.23840 0.37897 0.39405 
# samples 
> 0.392s 25 25 0 0 0 11 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .345 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
112.5 
unable to 
reject 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
25 25 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
325 
unable to 
reject 
325 
unable to 
reject 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Table 14. Performance statistics for Scenario 9 – Agent 4 sends false set equipment 
messages.  Trust implementations outperform original implementation.  
Original implementation trips breaker without valid fault conditions. 
 Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75. 
 Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68]. 
 Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].  
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score 
on top, p value on bottom). 
Implementation No trust scheme 
Add to set list if below trust 
threshold 
Add to set list only if bad 
% Traffic Lost 1 10 1 10 1 10 
Sample Mean 
(s) 
n/a n/a 0.238 0.23816 0.238 0.24072 
Maximum (s) n/a n/a 0.238 0.296 0.238 0.296 
3
rd
 Quartile (s) n/a n/a 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.238 
Median (s) n/a n/a 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.238 
1
st
 Quartile (s) n/a n/a 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.238 
Minimum (s) n/a n/a 0.238 0.226 0.238 0.238 
Sample Std Dev n/a n/a 0.00000 0.01299 0.00000 0.01155 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Std Error n/a n/a 0.00000 0.00260 0.00000 0.00231 
99.5% Error n/a n/a 0.00000 0.00726 0.00000 0.00646 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval Low (s) 
n/a n/a 0.23800 0.23090 0.23800 0.23426 
99% 
Confidence 
Interval High 
(s) 
n/a n/a 0.23800 0.24542 0.23800 0.24718 
# samples 
> 0.392s 
n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test 
Median=0.392s 
n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.392s 
n/a n/a 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
# of samples 
> 0.592s 
n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
Sign Test for 
Median - 
0.592s 
n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test 
Median=0.592 
n/a n/a 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
0 
0.005 
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Appendix B.  Performance Charts for Data by Scenario 
 
Figure 17. Fault clearing times for Scenario 1, no malicious behavior.  Approximately 
equal performance for all implementations under normal circumstances.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 18. Fault clearing times for Scenario 2, Agent 5 sends no response messages.  
Approximately equal performance for all agent implementations.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 19. Fault clearing times for Scenario 3, Agent 5 sends no set equipment messages.  
Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
 97 
 
Figure 20. Fault clearing times for Scenario 4, Agent 5 sends no response or set 
equipment messages.  Trust system outperforms original agent 
implementation.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 21. Fault clearing times for Scenario 5, Agent 5 sends false set equipment 
messages.  Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.  Original 
implementation tripped prior without actual fault.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 22. Fault clearing times for Scenario 6, Agent 4 sends no response messages.  
Approximately equal performance for all agent implementations.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 23. Fault clearing times for Scenario 7, Agent 4 sends no set equipment messages.  
Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 24. Fault clearing times for Scenario 8, Agent 4 sends no response or set 
equipment messages.  Trust system outperforms the original agent 
implementation.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Figure 25. Fault clearing times for Scenario 9, Agent 4 sends false set equipment 
messages.  Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.  Original 
implementation tripped without actual fault.   
 n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.   
 Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75. 
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Appendix C.  Agent Action and Trust Calculation Pseudocode 
Agent Interaction Pseudocode:  This pseudocode guides agent behavior between time 
synchronization events.  It covers the general events an agent might encounter and how it 
adjusts trust metrics for another agent.  
Require:  PSCAD simulator and agent server and clients to be synchronized in time 
Agent/PSCAD information update 
 Agent obtains local PSCAD power readings (Voltage and Current for 3 phases) 
 Agent obtains local fault detection results (zone 1 and zone 3 coverage zones) 
 Agent obtains local equipment status (breaker settings) 
Agent action period 
 Check local response messages as they arrive 
  Update trust metrics 
  Check for/verify faults in zone 1, zone 3 and in opposite direction 
 Trip breaker if fault exists in zone 3 and not cleared by primary agents 
 Process all stored messages 
  Respond to all information queries 
  Process all set equipment requests 
   If from 1-hop neighbor and fault is verified – trip breaker 
   If from 2-hop neighbor, fault is verified 
    If 1-hop neighbor did not clear fault – trip breaker 
  Ensure data from response messages updates local view of system 
 Send information queries to approprieate agents 
 Check/update trust values and cross reference information 
 If you observe zone 1 fault and verified 
  Send set equipment to neighbor sharing protection 
 Resend any necessary set equipment messages for redundancy 
 Verify success or failure of breaker trips 
 Block local trips if fault conditions not verified by any trusted agent 
Prepare for time resynchronization 
Trust Interaction Pseudocode:  This pseudocode guides trust structure development and 
demonstrates general trust computations 
Create a trust history used for quick lookup of trust metrics in the local storage implementation 
Create a trust store to track trust cookies for each node 
 Create a trust cookie for each node to track behavior 
Update trust cookie and history each time a query message is sent 
 Increment query and response queue counters and place correct value in the query queue 
Update trust cookie and history each time a response message is received 
 Place correct value in the response queue 
 Check contents of response vs observed conditions and override trust metric if necessary 
Update trust cookie and history each time a set equipment message is received 
 Check contents of set equipment message vs conditions and override trust metric if necessary 
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